Dangerous Theorizing by the Persian Think Tank
to Preserve Iran’s Fascist System
Proxy Think Tanks of the “Iran-Shahri” Philosophy and Side-lining the National Movement of Azerbaijan
Among the new and unprecedented tactics of the Persian think tank is the creation of proxy think tanks based on the “Iran-Shahri” philosophy — that is, preserving Persian hegemony, maintaining Persian as the “common and national” language at the cost of erasing the Turkic language, and preserving territorial integrity at the cost of continuing occupation and internal colonialism — along with manufacturing distractions and alternative movements to undermine the Azerbaijani national movement.
In the past, the Persian think tank would directly employ self-denying and self-selling individuals such as Hasan Taqizadeh and Taqi Arani. Persian political groups would typically form, alongside committees on women’s rights, LGBTQ issues, and disability rights, another committee under names like “Working Group on Ethnicities,” “Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Ethnicities,” or “House of Ethnicities” within reformist circles.
However, after the national uprising of Azerbaijan in May–June 2006, the Azerbaijani national movement drew clear red lines with Persian-centric centralists. By announcing non-participation in the 2009 election disputes — leading to the defeat of the “golden continuity seekers” of the Imam (the Green Movement) — the Persian think tank, unable to exploit Turks directly, resorted to a policy of infiltration and indirect parallel-building.
To launch these parallel currents, the right-wing “Iran-Shahri” philosophical faction within the Islamic Republic coordinated separately but in sync with the left-wing “Iran-Shahri” faction of global communism/socialism against the Azerbaijani national movement. An example is the promotion of the “Azariha” circle — a mixture of regime-paid intelligence agents falsely labeled as “Azeri Turks,” Turk-hating self-hating women, Persians, and Armenian Turkophones opposed to Turks. Similarly, there is the circle within the national movement inclined toward reformists, the mushroom-like growth of parallel Telegram channels, and the creation of a deceptive cyber network under the pseudonym “Mehran Behari” / “Absent Soldiers of the Imam of Time,” both inside and outside the country.
There is also the emergence of small leftist Azerbaijani federalist circles, such as the “Azerbaijan–Iran Federal Democratic Movement,” long-time Azerbaijani pan-Iranist communists leaning toward reformists, and their splinter group called “Birlik,” also leaning toward reformists, as well as the “M. Behari” network and Kurdish and Persian leftist terrorist groups abroad. These two circles, both based in Sweden, despite having some inactive but well-intentioned veteran names on paper, are unfortunately run by leaders who suffer from Stockholm syndrome and have for years engaged in self-sabotage.
The record of these narcissists is full of destructive and suspicious stances, including: writing letters to Mohammad Khatami from Sweden and calling for participation in the Persian Green Movement; glorifying regime figures such as Mohsen Mehralizadeh and Mir-Hossein Mousavi; forming alliances and even performing the “Baba Karam” dance with Persian anti-Turk political groups and Kurdish terrorist supporters; secret cooperation and “Berzi Berzi” dancing with Kurdish terrorist groups; alignment with and promotion of the regime’s “Mehran Behari” network.
Recent activities include infiltrating media associated with the national movement to promote the “Iran-Shahri” philosophy and issuing the disgraceful statement “Do Not Shoot at the People’s Aspirations!” in Stockholm, which led to their exposure and scandal.
Beyond their deliberate concealments, the incoherent ramblings of this crowd under the guise of “media activity” are so distorted that they refuse to take responsibility for what they themselves have said and published, and run away from accountability. In any case, monitoring the “hide-and-seek” and tricks of this group is so easy that before the ink of their treacherous pen has dried, with a small push they retreat shamefully into the corner of their circles for long periods.
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Final Word
The final word is that the Persian think tank, because of the failure of its project to homogenize the non-Persian nations over the past 96 years, and the failure of the theory of “One Country, One Nation, One Identity, and One Language,” is seeking new fascist theories with deceptive and populist slogans. To preserve and strengthen its fascist domination over non-Persian nationalities, it has once again targeted the Azerbaijani Turk nation — because it knows well that the only force capable of dismantling the chauvinistic–fascist structure of the current system is indeed the Azerbaijani Turk nation.
Whether or not the Persian think tank gives up its supremacist and fascist delusions is its own concern — but it must know well that in no field, including theory-making, will it be the uncontested master of the game. It will be confronted by the Azerbaijani Turk think tank and the field forces of the national movement, armed with the weapon of knowledge and faith, and committed to the lofty ideals of the Azerbaijani Turk nation.
Fortunately, the think tank of the Azerbaijani national movement is so strong and steadfast in theory, faith, and firm belief in progressive human values that it has thus far been able to neutralize their colorful conspiracies on the spot. The Persian fascist think tank must know that if it does not stop its nonsense and bullying and sit in its place, a fate far worse than that of the Serbian fascists of Yugoslavia awaits it.
— Umud Duzgun – Sep 03, 2020
Appendices
*1 – The Shuʿubiyyah Movement:
Following the domination of the Umayyads, the Arab Umayyads considered themselves a superior race and viewed Persians as an inferior race — “Ajam” and “Mawali.” The Shuʿubiyyah movement initially arose to break free from Umayyad rule and to prevent assimilation and the loss of national identity, standing against the Umayyad caliphs. But later, Persian Shuʿubiyyans themselves fell into racist nationalism and responded to Umayyad Arab racism with Persian Shuʿubiyyah racism, denigrating Arab identity and culture and claiming superiority over Arabs. Unfortunately, today, this same fascist ideology, under the decorative name of “Pan-Iranism,” is being deployed against Arabs, Turks, and others.
*2 – Ata Hoodashtian, in another part of his interview with Reza Goharzad, says:
“If I am Persian, it doesn’t necessarily mean I am not Turk. It’s true I’m not Turk, but I can build a new identity with a Turk — and that identity is my Iranian identity.”
(In reality, this is again just a Persian identity.) Such a statement cannot apply to a Turk, Arab, or Kurd, because without a shared language — and when the Persian refuses to speak the other’s language — there can be no identity bond allowing them to say, “My identity is Iranian.” It is clear that what he means is assimilated Arabs, Kurds, Baloch, and Turks — Azerified, Kurdified, Baluchified…
Video link, first video from minute 30
Video link, second video from minute 51
*3 – Statements by Mohammad Reza Nikfar, writer residing in the Netherlands:
“Islam in the Secular Future of Iran” (2019)
Topics: 1- New Shiism, 2- The Turk–Persian Question, 3- The Azerbaijan Question.
*4 – Analytical Statement: “Do Not Shoot at the People’s Aspirations!”
Original statement
Critique of the statement — Umud Duzgun:
Critique article
ANTV interview — Critique of the statement and the Kurdish issue:
YouTube link
*5 – The Iran-Shahri Philosophy is, in essence, the same as the ideology of Pan-Persianism of the Persian minority. Because it cannot expand on its own, it uses the name “Iranian-ness” to cover the non-Persian nations under its rule, in order to artificially enlarge its geographical domain — employing identity-sold-out agents from other nationalities, such as Seyed Hasan Taqizadeh, Taqi Arani, and Seyed Javad Tabatabaei.
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Mohsen Mehralizadeh, reformist candidate in the 9th presidential election (sixth place), current head of the Zurkhaneh Sports Federation, and chairman of the board of Asia Water Development Company, implementing the project to desalinate and transfer water from the Arabian Gulf to Persian-majority areas like Kerman and Yazd.
*6 – See:
Anatomy of the Deceptive Nature of the Regime’s Mehran Behari Network — Umud Duzgun
Umud Düzgün
August 25, 2020
Although we are approaching the collapse of the Persian minority regime in Iran, we are seeing anxious, panic-like warnings and statements from the totalitarian factions inside and outside the system. But what is hidden from view and less placed before public opinion are the dangerous theory-makings devised to preserve the structure of the 96-year fascist system in Iran. The “Persian think tank,” in various centers—sometimes as invisible hands and sometimes as visible ones, in different forms—is busy manufacturing theories. The main axis of these theories is based on preserving a centralized fascist structure, continuing the policy of imposing Persian identity and language on other ethnicities, denying identity, and banning the languages of non-Persian nations in the country’s administrative and educational system. In other words, the core of their work is not recognizing the human, cultural, political, and economic rights of the non-Persian peoples in Iran—on which, astonishingly, almost all Persian intellectuals and political groups share a common view and act in concert! Of course, each of the left, right, and centrist factions, while doing this, employs a number of identity-lost mercenaries from among the non-Persian nations as tools.
In this piece, while tracing the roots and various dimensions of this fascist way of thinking, and by presenting several documented examples of the dangerous theory-makings of the Persian think tank across different leanings, I will address the fascist nature of the think-tank elements, Persian intellectuals, and theorists at home and abroad.
The historical background of the Persian think tank’s theorizing (briefly)
The theorizing of the Persian think tank takes place along two axes: Persian nationalism and Shuʿubi Shiʿite religion—which have experienced many ebbs and flows over the past thirteen centuries. The beginning of this theorizing goes back to the Shuʿubiyya movement, which was built on a racist, antiquity-worshiping ideology. After the Sasanians’ defeat by the Arabs (the Battle of Qadisiyya under ʿUmar ibn al-Khattab) in southern and central Iran, and the dispute over ʿAli ibn Abi Talib’s succession that led to Muʿawiya’s accession and the emergence of Shiʿism, using this situation, the Persians opposed to Umayyad rulers in Iran drew close to the Shiʿite forces opposed to the Umayyads and set the Shuʿubiyya in motion in Iran.
Centuries later, France and Britain, for their colonial purposes, exploited the theory of “Shiʿa–Sunni” religious distinction to their benefit and fanned the flames of war between two Turkic brothers at the Battle of Chaldiran, opening another front against the Ottoman Turkish Empire, which was already at war with them. With the Safavid army’s defeat at Chaldiran and the weakening of Safavid sovereignty, and then the transfer of the Turks’ capital from Azerbaijan to the Persian-speaking central regions, the soft power of the Persian think tank managed to increase its influence within the Safavid government.
After Aga Mohammad Khan was assassinated and the Qajar Empire weakened against Russia, Britain’s sensitivity toward Russia increased and brought Britain into competition—of the infiltration and interference variety—within the Qajar rulership. To maintain balance, the Qajar government was forced to accommodate Britain. But this accommodation harmed the Qajars, because His Britannic Majesty’s Government, by creating Masonic lodges and injecting money, managed to organize its own agents in Iran. After Naser al-Din Shah’s assassination, with Britain’s help the Persian think tank was able to insert its pawns into the Qajar court and succeeded in creating a deep state. Under Mozaffar al-Din Shah, infiltrating pawns of the Persian think tank—supported by Britain—acted as the enemy’s fifth column in the parliament, the government, and the army.
Finally, under Ahmad Shah, after the British coup by Seyyed Zia and Reza Khan (1920/1299), Britain handed over to then–Prime Minister Mohammad-Ali Foroughi the project drafted with the advice of the Parsis of India led by Ardeshir Reporter to change the semi-federal political structure of the Qajar “Mamalek-e Mahrouseh” (Guarded Domains). But that wasn’t the whole story. With its core in Mahmoud Afshar Yazdi’s circle in Berlin, the Persian think tank, in order to fully cement Persian hegemony, succeeded in inserting into Reza Khan’s state apparatus the fascist homogenization theory borrowed from Nazism which they had drawn up years earlier. Over the past 96 years, this very theory—“one nation, one country, one identity, and one language”—*6 – See: Anatomy of the Deceptive Nature of the Regime’s “Mehran Behari” Network – Umud Duzgun
https://ayiq-eller.blogspot.com/2018/12/
The “Integration” Theory in Iran and the Turk–Persian Confrontation
This video shows a slice of the theory-making against the Azerbaijani Turk nation that has been formulated in the Persian fascism think tank. The speaker is one of the “repentant” Persian communist leftists, Mohammad Reza Nikfar, who—after seeing (a “sign of God”) Khomeini in the moon and then fleeing from the terror of Khomeini’s spirit—lost his way instead of going to Cuba or North Korea and popped up from under the basket of the Western bourgeoisie. For several years now, under the pretext of promoting democracy, he has been abusing the Dutch government’s aid and subsidies—pocketing the money of Dutch taxpayers and petty bourgeois—without any useful service to the host society, to advertise Pan-Persianism and rescue the century-old Persian fascist system in dark think tanks, under the cover of Radio Zamaneh, doing what he himself calls “media work”!
Because Persian fascism’s project to homogenize the non-Persian nations over the past hundred years has failed and the theory of assimilation—“one nation, one identity, one language”—has not worked, they are searching for new theories with deceptive and populist slogans, and to advance their racist and fascist aims they have again made the Azerbaijani Turk nation their first target. (From minute 17 of the video.) Referring to the insufficient results from the betrayals of Seyyed Ahmad Kasravi (a manqurt Turk) against his own nation, he seems to be looking for a new anti-Turk theory and new Turk traitors (manqurts).
Over the past 20 years, the right and left wings of Persian fascism—under various titles such as citizens’ rights, democracy, secularism, the right of nations to self-determination (provided that right is not used), economic or geographic/provincial federalism, ethnic federalism (without providing military guarantees), self-rule, a decentralized republican system, a Leninist socialist system even with the right to secession (on paper but keeping it silent forever), and the like—have sought to save the collapsing structure of Persian fascism after the overthrow of today’s Persian-Shiite Shuʿubist fascist regime. To push their aims forward, they have tried to deceive some national activists of the Azerbaijani national movement and use them as a trigger. Fortunately, from a theoretical standpoint the Azerbaijani national movement is so strong and firm that it has managed to repel all their plots. And the few who were fooled by the promises of the Transition Management Council and one or two other suspicious circles quickly realized their double-dealing in the name of democracy and exposed the filthy tricks of Persian fascism. Even so, Persian fascism still continues, behind the mask of democracy, to devise theories and impose its own alternative to preserve the racist and fascist hegemony of the Persian minority. The Persian fascism think tank must know that if it does not sit in its place, the fate of the Serbian fascists of Yugoslavia awaits it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1605&v=gCx3TQ8svcM&fbclid=IwAR2sfiyUr1ZPN5lTiDQRHWwVYrJikaVeC3jZk1rY6TVmeGSNHsZ8gc5oogw
İnteqrasiya teorisi və Türk–Fars qarşı durması (Azerbaijani)
Keçən 100 ildə, Fars faşizmi Azərbaycan Türk millətinə qarşı yaratdığı nəzəriyyələr əsasında istədikləri nəticəni ala bilmədiklərinə rəğmən, özlərindən getmirlər və durmadan müxtəlif görünümlərdə yeni nəzəriyyələr yaratmağa cəhd edirlər. Bu video klipdə 17-inci dəqiqədə inteqrasiya teorisindən və Türk–Fars qarşı durmasından söhbət aparırlar!
Keçən 20 ildə müxtəlif sağ və sol Fars faşizmini təmsil edən siyasi qruplar bu nəzəriyyələr əsasında: vətəndaşlıq hüququ, demokratiya, sekulyarizm, özünü-idarə hüququ, mədəni muxtariyyət, mərkəzləşmənin olmaması, iqtisadi federallıq, əyalət federallığı, “millətlərin öz müqəddəratını təyin etmə hüququ”nun olması – amma ondan istifadə etmədən, hətta “millətlərin ayrılma hüququ”nun kağız üzərində olması – amma ondan heç söz açmamaq və aradakı müxtəlif aldatmacalar və s. ilə...
İstəyiblər Azərbaycan milli fəallarını aldadıb və onları Fars faşizminə maşa olaraq kullansınlar. Amma Azərbaycan milli hərəkəti nəzəri baxımdan o qədər güclüdür ki, onların hamısına dəf olunub və onların toruna düşən 2–3 nəfər də peşiman olub Fars faşizminin kəskin hiylələrini ifşa ediblər. Buna baxmayaraq, Fars faşizmi demokratiya maskası altında yeni alternativ nəzəriyyələr yaratmalarına davam etməkdədirlər. Amma bu dəfə Seyyed Əhməd Kəsrəvi, Həsən Təqizadə və Təqi Ərani kimi manqurtları tapsalar belə, onları maşa kimi bizim millətin gözünə soxa bilməyəcəklər.
The necessity of efforts to standardize the alphabets and orthography of mother tongues with the Persian contact language
Yusef Kor, a Turkmen national activist and supporter of a federal Iran, who also has a record of cooperation with the Persian communist Fedayeen-e Khalq, writes in an article in Iran Global (September 2020):
“The necessity of striving to harmonize the alphabets and methods of writing of the mother tongues with the Persian contact language in Iran is inescapable.
A review of measures implemented in many countries—including the Soviet Union and the European Union—shows that strengthening the union of peoples in multilingual and multicultural countries requires, on the one hand, efforts to increase and reinforce commonalities in the domain of orthography, and on the other hand efforts, as far as possible, to reduce differences in that domain. This work increases understanding and trust among the various ethnicities and nationalities in Iran. To provide the grounds for acceptance of the claim being made, it is necessary… The addition of extra letters to create the alphabet and orthography of the Persian language has been limited only to four consonants; its failure to be ‘updated’ in the 21st century still continues.”
In reality, knowingly or unknowingly, he has become a fuel-carrier for Pan-Persianism, speeding up the linguistic and cultural assimilation machine of the non-Persian nations and the equalization and dissolution of those languages into the imposed Persian language—and he is helping Ataollah Hoodashtian’s theory of “creating a hybrid Turkic–Persian language.”
Of course, the regime has not sat idle either, and has propagated the “Azari” language in Azerbaijan.has been the foundation of the Persian think tank’s thought. Before the revolution it came with tightening or loosening the role of Shuʿubi Shiʿism, and after the revolution, radical Shuʿubi Shiʿism has played a complementary role in advancing the theory of Aryan Persian fascism to this day. *1
Identity crisis and the complete collapse of Iran’s centralized structure
Numerous instances of physical identity-killing have occurred in various parts of Iran—still audible from eyewitnesses’ mouths and visible in documentary films. By reviewing only one case of Reza Khan’s physical identity-killing in Lorestan, one can grasp the depth of the catastrophe and immediately call it ethnic cleansing or genocide. Alongside that, we are witnessing state-run, systematic soft identity-killing to destroy the culture and languages of non-Persian nations. In the past, this phenomenon had become so entrenched that even questioning this fascist apartheid system was impossible. But following the collapse of the communist Eastern Bloc and the global spread of identity-seeking, we have witnessed an unprecedented rise in national self-awareness and the recovery of identity among the non-Persian peoples of Iran. The demands raised over the last three decades have been so numerous—and left unanswered—that the identity crisis in Iran has turned into a powder keg that is on the verge of setting the entire foundation of the existing system on fire.
On the other hand, researchers in various fields—economists speaking of complete bankruptcy; sociologists of social order’s collapse; psychologists of a sharp drop in tolerance and rising individual acts of violence—paint a dire picture. Politicians speak of the disintegration of the dysfunctional system of “Islamic management based on loyalty” (corruption and patronage), the loss of control over the country, the regime’s free-fall, and the complete collapse of Iran’s century-old totalitarian centralized structure.
Warnings from the “reformists”
Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, leader of the reformist current and the regime’s safety valve, says in an interview: “Society may, to express dissatisfaction and escape despair, incline toward violence; naturally, the government may resort to counter-violence, and a cycle may be created, and this cycle may increase hatred and violence on both sides and create many problems.” That is, popular revolt and urban warfare with the security forces could spell the overthrow and collapse of Iran’s regime.
After the bloody suppression of the November 2019 uprising, Sadegh Zibakalam, one of the reformist theorists, worriedly said: “This pattern of suppression will gradually pave the way for underground struggle and, at the next stage, armed struggle.” He too, like Khatami, believes the struggle against the regime is entering a radical and armed phase.
Warnings and “alternative-building” by the Persian opposition abroad
Alternative-building is one of the Persian opposition’s chief preoccupations in exile. From royalist rightists and the People’s Mojahedin to the communist left and the Transition Council, each claims to be the best alternative for crossing the land-mine-strewn bridge of the fascist regime and replacing it! Oblivious to the fact that without first clearing the mines of their own fascist ideas, they have already forfeited the legitimacy to succeed and to move beyond Iran’s fascist regime. Thus, despite financial resources, organizations, seasoned cadres, professional propaganda tools, strong media, and foreign political/financial support, the Persian opposition’s performance has borne no fruit; because of a totalitarian, dictatorial political culture among Persian elites, in the past 41 years the Persian opposition has faced countless splits and has stagnated. But this does not mean the Persian opposition is comatose. Despite all the differences and failures, the Persian opposition continues its illegitimate, totalizing alternative-building.
The Persian think tank and the challenge of the identity crisis
Unlike in the past, the debate on identity—and the identity crisis that has taken shape over the past decades following the identity-seeking struggles of Iran’s non-Persian nations—did not have a vital salience for earlier rulers. The identity marker that mattered for modern rulers up to the early post-revolution years was “Persian identity and Iran-ness.” The symbol of nationalism and identity for Mohammad Mossadegh, the Pahlavis, Mehdi Bazargan, and Bani-Sadr was “ancient and Shiʿite Iranian-Persian nationalism.” And the symbol of nationalism and identity for Rouhollah Khomeini and Seyyed Ali Khamenei is “Shuʿubi Shiʿite Iranian-Persian nationalism.” During the Pahlavis’ 57-year rule, to cement pan-Iranism and pan-Persianism, emphasis was placed on ancient identity, the Aryan race, and the Persian language. During the 41 years of Khomeini-Khamenei’s rule—with the exception of a few months after the revolution—that same monolingual Persian chauvinist/fascist policy of the Pahlavi era has continued and is applied systematically. In other words, while preserving the identity structure of the Pahlavi regime, the Islamic Republic—by highlighting Islamic-Shiʿite identity and putting even more emphasis on the Persian language—has tightened the foundations of pan-Iranism and has managed, under the cover of Islamic-Shiʿite identity and Persian nationalism, to extend pan-Iranism beyond borders.
However, what has emerged over the past three decades, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, under the banner of identity recovery among oppressed nations in the world and in Iran, has called into question the foundation of fabricated Iranian-Persian identity. This identity recovery has also exposed the identity crisis of the Persian ethnicity/nation and has greatly alarmed the Persian think tank. In the past, thanks to their monopoly over media, Persians could foist a false, deceptive definition of “the Iranian people/nation” in place of the Persian people/nation. But with the spread of free media, it has become impossible for Persians to call themselves a special, woven-of-different-cloth people. Even today, acknowledging being an ethnicity, redefining the Persian nation/ethnicity, has produced indigestible consequences for the Persian think tank. Among them:
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The problem of admitting minority status: i.e., accepting that the Persian ethnicity constitutes approximately 18% plus 15% of a mixed Persian population in Iran.
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The problem of having multiple Persian identities: the difference between the Persians of Tehran—deliberately a mix of Persians and assimilated non-Persians—and other areas like Isfahan, Kerman, Yazd, etc., who consider themselves pure Persians.
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The problem of determining geographic bounds: the difficulty of defining the geography of Farsestan acceptable to mixed Persians in Tehran and Alborz provinces versus the Persians of the center and south—the historical realm of Farsestan—who consider themselves pure.
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The problem of identifying the center of Persian thought: confusion in determining a single center of gravity for Persian thought for the Persian nation. Contrary to the prevailing belief of Persian centralist intellectuals, the Tehran accent is not the standard language of other Persian regions. The language and thought-system of the Persian nation are dual and multiple: Tehran-centered, Isfahan-centered, Kerman-centered, Shiraz-centered, etc.
Therefore, to avoid confronting these problems, the Persian think tank not only hides the plurality of its own ethnic language, but also tries to cover up the identity crisis of its own ethnicity; instead of grounding identity in their ethnicity, they make knowledge of Persian the criterion and the standard—so they can extend the implicit Persian identity to non-Persian ethnicities as well, thereby passing off the Persian minority as a majority. Whereas Azerbaijan has a contiguous historical territory from Maku to Tehran, centered on Tabriz, and the Turkic language of Azerbaijanis in Tabriz and Urmia is the same as that of Azerbaijanis in Tehran, and its thought system is based on the “Azerbaijan-centered thought system.”
The regime’s large investment in the Persian think tank
At the top levels of the Islamic Republic’s rulership, the Persian think tank operates mostly in secret (invisible domestic and foreign hands), managed by the Office of the Leader, Intelligence/Etelaʿat–SAVAMA, and the Supreme National Security Council, and under the influence of figures such as Ali-Akbar Velayati, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, and Mohsen Rezaei. In the reformist camp, figures such as Tajzadeh, Saeed Hajjarian, and Seyyed Mohammad Khatami are among the Persian think tank’s theorists. With minor differences, both factions invest—at home and abroad—in two axes for the regime’s survival and the preservation of the existing fascist structure in Iran: Shuʿubi Shiʿism and Iran-centric Persian philosophy. The only major difference is in how to conceptualize and operationalize the homogenization of non-Persian nations and the modes of controlling and suppressing identity-seeking and independence-seeking movements.
In addition to intelligence/secret centers, various research institutes in the Ministry of Culture and Science, universities, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc., run by principalists, continuation-seekers (reformists), nationalist groups, and infiltrators from the Tudeh Party and the pan-Persian left in state bodies, are active using research/academic budgets. The Persian minority regime has also created cyber networks (“Soldiers of the Imam of the Age”) to infiltrate and advance its fascist goals and is busy producing misleading instant-overthrow theories—Hakhā-style 24-hour revolution, Rouhollah Zam, the Kingdom Assembly of Iran, Ābān Organization (pro-IRGC coup), the Transition Management Council (peacefully “walking across land mines”!)—and other laughable cyber “opposition” theories as well.
Another vile trick of the Persian regime’s think tank is proxy-engineering the powerful exile media. To sustain itself and preserve the 96-year fascist structure and ensure its continuation, what it cannot broadcast via IRIB—whitewashing the regime’s disgraces, promoting pan-Persianism beyond the strictures of religion and the system—it does by injecting money, coaching anchors in Tehran and sending them abroad as “immigrants,” secretly transferring IRIB archives under the label of “theft,” and by engineering news and programs through the regime’s infiltrators in channels like BBC Persian (supporters of reformist fascists), VOA, Manoto, and Radio Farda (supporters of a return to Pahlavi fascism). With proxy funding they have also helped launch Iran International (continuation-seekers of Persian fascism, 2009 model—foreign branch), the fascist channel “Roodast,” and other loudmouth TV stations of the right, the communist left, and the Mojahedin pretending to be opponents—some of which are fed both by foreign aid (e.g., from Saudi Arabia…) and by large budgets from the Islamic Republic under the names of wealthy Arab, Jewish, and Iranian “businessmen,” plus donations from anonymous viewers of Jamkaran wells with fake names like Kourosh, Dariush, Arash, etc., in varying amounts—and through these very media they transmit to public opinion the regime-desired orientation.
For that reason, it is not easy to distinguish the ideas of the domestic Persian think tank from those of the exile Persian think tank—to the point that some exile members of the Persian think tank openly line up beside the regime’s repression machine, the IRGC, to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the regime’s criminals against the movements of the non-Persian nations to preserve Iran’s fascist structure.
New identity-building by the Persian think tank of the exile opposition
The new identity-building by the Persian think tank emphasizes an instrumental redefinition of the place of Shiʿism and Turkic identity within today’s “Iran-ness.” The pan-Persianist investment to return to pre-Islamic Iran has been fruitless because there are no salient, presentable civilizational achievements to showcase; much that Persians boast of and call “national” belongs more to Turkic and Arab thinkers and is a product of the post-Islamic period. Therefore, the intermingling of Iran and Islam has been—and remains—so deep that constructing an Iran-ness distinct from Islam is impossible. Thus they try to change the nature of Islam and of Shiʿism and to direct it in favor of Persian nationalism; in each era they offer a new type of Shiʿism—for example: clubbish Shuʿubi Shiʿism, seminary Shuʿubi Shiʿism of Allameh Majlesi (transfer of Shiʿism’s center from Najaf to Qom by British agents), red Alavid Shuʿubi Shiʿism (Ali Shariati), and Velayi Shuʿubi Shiʿism (Velayat-e Faqih—Rouhollah Khomeini). For the day after the regime’s collapse, the Persian think tank seeks to invent a new Shiʿism, a “composite Shiʿism,” and, in desperation, has even clutched at other religions and the non-religious.
The Persian think tank and Persian rulership have also pursued the assimilation and forced integration of the Azerbaijani Turk population into the Persians, and in each period they have posited and executed a new integration theory. In implementing this plan, beyond external factors, our own side’s mistakes in the Constitutional era (e.g., Akhundzadeh, Heydar Amo-Oghlu, …) under the cover of “Iran-ness and modernity” played a role in dimming Turkic identity and Azerbaijan’s place. Under the Pahlavis, the integration theory took an overt form—physical, cultural, and linguistic genocide—and under the Islamic Republic it has continued in various forms. Recently, the Persian think tank has sought to invent a composite identity theory and a composite “Turkic-Persian” language.
Two examples of the Persian think tank’s theorizing abroad
Following the expansion of identity-seeking struggles by non-Persian nations and the Persian think tank’s inability to erase the “identity crisis in Iran,” the Persian factions on the right and left that favor preserving the fascist system in Iran—inside and outside the country—have become unusually active; to quell the crisis and manage public opinion, they falsely present themselves as supporters of democratic concepts and, under various headings—citizens’ rights, democracy, secularism, the right of nations to self-determination (provided that right is not used), economic or geographic provincial federalism, ethnic federalism (without military guarantees), self-rule, a decentralized republic, a Leninist socialist system even with a right to secede (on paper, but kept silent forever), and the like—have set about prescribing solutions for Iran’s identity crisis. The common point among all of them is preserving the 96-year Persian-centric fascist structure after the overthrow of the current regime.
Here, to grasp the depth of the deception of the exile Persian think tank, I will mention just two examples of such theorizing from the right and from the left.
Example (1)
One of the prominent monarchist theorists living in the multinational state of Canada, a PhD in philosophy named Atā Hodashtian, says in a TV interview that he supports a new “composite identity” for Iran and says: “From two separate identities (Persian and Turk)—that is, through mixed Persian–Turk families—let’s build a new Iranian identity; and instead of emphasizing the superiority of Persian identity, let’s emphasize the new composite Iranian identity which is the heir to a set of values and a literature that all of us, Persians and Turks alike, love Ferdowsi, Hafez, Rumi, and that this ancient tradition has come down to us.” First of all, it is obvious he assumes Persians as the core/center and Turks as the non-core/periphery, who should lose their language and identity in favor of Persians, assimilate into the dominant Persian culture and language, and form a new composite family homogenized with Persians. That is, in making this composite identity, not only is the culture and language of Persians left untouched, they even progress and are elevated.
In other words, in building this composite identity, equal rights are not recognized for Persian and Turk. In fact, this is a kind of eliminative amalgamation of identity and the dissolving of Azerbaijani Turk identity into the Persian one. Because he too—like other Persian intellectuals—does not believe in the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; like the Guardian Council of the ayatollahs, he imposes “conditions”! Hodashtian says: “I accept the clauses of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but with conditions (!). For example, regarding the mother tongue—yes, it should be free—but Persian as the “national” language, which “everyone” in Iran accepts Hafez and Ferdowsi (!), and a Turk must learn Persian alongside his local language.”
Setting aside the fascistic nature of this so-called learned, civilized Persian philosopher and professor in U.S. and Canadian universities, the words and phrases he uses—“national Persian language,” “local language,” Turks being heirs to Ferdowsi (anti-Turk), etc.—carry negative and insulting connotations. The 35-million nation of South Azerbaijani Turks, like any nation, are heirs to their own Turkic culture, language, and literature; their own poetry and poets, music, arts, and historical past—not to that of outsiders, nor sworn enemies, nor to a racist, fascist poet like Ferdowsi of Tus.
Hodashtian adds: “I support the French system but with Iranian (Persian) characteristics, because we have different ethnicities and nations, and whatever system it is, it must be within the framework of territorial integrity, which is our (Persians’) red line.” He forgets that the era of imperatives and “must-must” is over; Iran’s territorial integrity and the Persian language are not the red lines of Azerbaijan’s Turks.
Contrary to his claim of being secular, Atā Hodashtian cannot tolerate freedom, independence of action, and equality of religions before the law; regarding a new (religious) composite Shiʿite identity, he says: “Even if we are anti-religion, we have a religious substructure in Iran which is based on a Shiʿite majority; and for tomorrow’s Iran (after the collapse) and to preserve Iran-ness (the fascist system) we need a new Shiʿism.” What he means is creating a new Shuʿubi Shiʿism, formed from a mix of the irreligious and non-Shiʿite faiths. In other words, to preserve the 96-year fascist structure of Iran, instead of insisting on separating religion and state, he issues fatwas to the non-Shiʿites to harmonize with the Shiʿite crescent policy and with Shuʿubi Shiʿite superstition—even if they are atheist, Jewish, Bahai, or Christian. Non-Shiʿites should, like the Armenian minority, organize Ashura mourning processions—beating their chests and chains—and, to safeguard Iran-centric philosophy, perform qama-zani (self-flagellation). *2
Example (2)
Another Persian think-tank theorist is Mohammad-Reza Nikfar from the communist left who, making use of the Dutch capitalist state’s funds, has pitched his tent at Radio Zamaneh and offers a new Shiʿism and an imposed fake identity on Azerbaijan’s Turks to preserve Iran’s 96-year fascist system.
In a so-called Persian “intellectual” conference, Nikfar, pointing to the insufficient results of earlier theories and the betrayals of Seyyed Ahmad Kasravi, a Turk, against his nation (and of Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh, Kazemzadeh-e Shefaq, Taghi Arani…), indicates they are seemingly looking for a new anti-Turk theory and new (manqurt) Turk traitors.
Nikfar says: “The most important integration issue after removing current Shiʿism from power is the ‘Turk and Persian’ issue—i.e., Azerbaijan will become the central issue. Pay attention to what Seyyed Ahmad Kasravi saw. After Reza Shah’s removal and exile (to Africa) and the return of the opposition—including the clergy—to the political scene, Kasravi criticized Shiʿism and opposed the clergy’s presence. At the same time, the Azerbaijan issue and the National Government (Pishevari) arose. This change in Kasravi’s stance must be seen in connection with Azerbaijan. (Kasravi had a clerical background and had been an imam of a mosque.) He believed the thing that bound the two (Persians and Turks) together was the Shiʿitization of Iran. (So Kasravi started thinking of a solution.) To prevent cutting this bond (between Persians and Turks), at that very moment he imagined that by creating a new non-Turk nationalist ideology for Azerbaijan’s Turks he could solve the Azerbaijan issue. He wanted, for example, to forge for Azerbaijan another past (Kasravi wanted to fabricate an ancient Aryan-Persian nationalist ideology for the Turks, just as he fabricated the ‘Āzari language’), and then to say: we (Turks) have a shared historical past with the Persians. Shiʿism and the Turkic language are both incidental; we share the essential (ancient Aryan-Persian) element. And Kasravi introduced this ideology as the axis of Iran’s integration.”
It is noteworthy that Nikfar deems Kasravi’s theory for solving today’s identity crisis inoperative, saying: “We can no longer return to such ideologies. The era of state-nation-building based on ideology is over; we need another axis for Iran’s integration.” He concludes that the main issue now for the Persian think tank is: “How can we (Persians) answer the integration question?” Therefore, to preserve Iran’s 96-year fascist structure, he considers two vital axes for tomorrow’s Iran: a new Shiʿism and the integration issue—i.e., the merging and assimilation of Turks into Persians.
Another astonishing point in the alignment between the Persian right and left is their definition and understanding of democracy and secularism, and their distorting interpretation of these in favor of pan-Persianism to preserve Iran’s fascist structure. On this, Nikfar says: “Our (Persians’) secularism and democracy are the axis of a double evil: we want a non-powerful state and a weak religion.” In reality, he offers a self-made definition of secularism and democracy, because—due to the presence of the non-Persian nationalities issue and to suppress and control them—contrary to his claim they need a powerful central state; and along with imposing Persian to homogenize, they need a new Shiʿism to bind Persians and Turks together. The leftist Persian think tank (the “Netherlands model”), for example, is not even in favor of granting autonomy to remove discrimination against non-Persians! They consider individual freedom and participation alone sufficient!
Nikfar says: “I imagine that we (Persians) cannot advance matters based on autonomy for these groups (non-Persian nations). What is ideal for us is the maximum of individual freedom and participation (on the Persians’ playing field) (and not group or national freedom and participation for other nations). Therefore neither the French secular model nor Turkey’s secular model nor India’s model suits us (Persians).” He concludes: “We (Persians and the Persian think tank) must advance the integration issue (the process of merging and assimilation) so delicately (that Turks don’t feel the identity-killing and homogenization!). Of course, in our (Persians’) democracy, there is a dam called Iranian (Persian) conservatism which must be dealt with balancedly and without violence” (i.e., cutting the head with cotton).
This Persian conservatism means hard protection of the Persian think tank’s red fascist lines and soft management of the non-Persian nationalities issue—in other words, to bring the century-old project to its destination in the current weak, desperate conditions, Persian fascism is forced to retreat and hand out small alms like individual participation, and—instead of a knife—use cotton to cut off the neck of the non-Persian nations’ being, especially South Azerbaijan’s Turks. *3
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Proxy Think Tanks of the “Iran-Shahri” Philosophy and Side-lining the National Movement of Azerbaijan
Among the new and unprecedented tactics of the Persian think tank is the creation of proxy think tanks based on the “Iran-Shahri” philosophy — that is, preserving Persian hegemony, maintaining Persian as the “common and national” language at the cost of erasing the Turkic language, and preserving territorial integrity at the cost of continuing occupation and internal colonialism — along with manufacturing distractions and alternative movements to undermine the Azerbaijani national movement.
In the past, the Persian think tank would directly employ self-denying and self-selling individuals such as Hasan Taqizadeh and Taqi Arani. Persian political groups would typically form, alongside committees on women’s rights, LGBTQ issues, and disability rights, another committee under names like “Working Group on Ethnicities,” “Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Ethnicities,” or “House of Ethnicities” within reformist circles.
However, after the national uprising of Azerbaijan in May–June 2006, the Azerbaijani national movement drew clear red lines with Persian-centric centralists. By announcing non-participation in the 2009 election disputes — leading to the defeat of the “golden continuity seekers” of the Imam (the Green Movement) — the Persian think tank, unable to exploit Turks directly, resorted to a policy of infiltration and indirect parallel-building.
To launch these parallel currents, the right-wing “Iran-Shahri” philosophical faction within the Islamic Republic coordinated separately but in sync with the left-wing “Iran-Shahri” faction of global communism/socialism against the Azerbaijani national movement. An example is the promotion of the “Azariha” circle — a mixture of regime-paid intelligence agents falsely labeled as “Azeri Turks,” Turk-hating self-hating women, Persians, and Armenian Turkophones opposed to Turks. Similarly, there is the circle within the national movement inclined toward reformists, the mushroom-like growth of parallel Telegram channels, and the creation of a deceptive cyber network under the pseudonym “Mehran Behari” / “Absent Soldiers of the Imam of Time,” both inside and outside the country.
There is also the emergence of small leftist Azerbaijani federalist circles, such as the “Azerbaijan–Iran Federal Democratic Movement,” long-time Azerbaijani pan-Iranist communists leaning toward reformists, and their splinter group called “Birlik,” also leaning toward reformists, as well as the “M. Behari” network and Kurdish and Persian leftist terrorist groups abroad. These two circles, both based in Sweden, despite having some inactive but well-intentioned veteran names on paper, are unfortunately run by leaders who suffer from Stockholm syndrome and have for years engaged in self-sabotage.
The record of these narcissists is full of destructive and suspicious stances, including: writing letters to Mohammad Khatami from Sweden and calling for participation in the Persian Green Movement; glorifying regime figures such as Mohsen Mehralizadeh and Mir-Hossein Mousavi; forming alliances and even performing the “Baba Karam” dance with Persian anti-Turk political groups and Kurdish terrorist supporters; secret cooperation and “Berzi Berzi” dancing with Kurdish terrorist groups; alignment with and promotion of the regime’s “Mehran Behari” network.
Recent activities include infiltrating media associated with the national movement to promote the “Iran-Shahri” philosophy and issuing the disgraceful statement “Do Not Shoot at the People’s Aspirations!” in Stockholm, which led to their exposure and scandal.
Beyond their deliberate concealments, the incoherent ramblings of this crowd under the guise of “media activity” are so distorted that they refuse to take responsibility for what they themselves have said and published, and run away from accountability. In any case, monitoring the “hide-and-seek” and tricks of this group is so easy that before the ink of their treacherous pen has dried, with a small push they retreat shamefully into the corner of their circles for long periods.
Do you want me to keep going with “Final Word” and the appendices so we finish the entire article in one go? That way you’ll have it all in one continuous English text.
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Alright — here’s the continuation from “Final Word” to the end of the article, keeping it literal and faithful to the original wording:
Final Word
The final word is that the Persian think tank, because of the failure of its project to homogenize the non-Persian nations over the past 96 years, and the failure of the theory of “One Country, One Nation, One Identity, and One Language,” is seeking new fascist theories with deceptive and populist slogans. To preserve and strengthen its fascist domination over non-Persian nationalities, it has once again targeted the Azerbaijani Turk nation — because it knows well that the only force capable of dismantling the chauvinistic–fascist structure of the current system is indeed the Azerbaijani Turk nation.
Whether or not the Persian think tank gives up its supremacist and fascist delusions is its own concern — but it must know well that in no field, including theory-making, will it be the uncontested master of the game. It will be confronted by the Azerbaijani Turk think tank and the field forces of the national movement, armed with the weapon of knowledge and faith, and committed to the lofty ideals of the Azerbaijani Turk nation.
Fortunately, the think tank of the Azerbaijani national movement is so strong and steadfast in theory, faith, and firm belief in progressive human values that it has thus far been able to neutralize their colorful conspiracies on the spot. The Persian fascist think tank must know that if it does not stop its nonsense and bullying and sit in its place, a fate far worse than that of the Serbian fascists of Yugoslavia awaits it.
— Umud Duzgun – Sep 03, 2020
Appendices
*1 – The Shuʿubiyyah Movement:
Following the domination of the Umayyads, the Arab Umayyads considered themselves a superior race and viewed Persians as an inferior race — “Ajam” and “Mawali.” The Shuʿubiyyah movement initially arose to break free from Umayyad rule and to prevent assimilation and the loss of national identity, standing against the Umayyad caliphs. But later, Persian Shuʿubiyyans themselves fell into racist nationalism and responded to Umayyad Arab racism with Persian Shuʿubiyyah racism, denigrating Arab identity and culture and claiming superiority over Arabs. Unfortunately, today, this same fascist ideology, under the decorative name of “Pan-Iranism,” is being deployed against Arabs, Turks, and others.
*2 – Ata Hoodashtian, in another part of his interview with Reza Goharzad, says:
“If I am Persian, it doesn’t necessarily mean I am not Turk. It’s true I’m not Turk, but I can build a new identity with a Turk — and that identity is my Iranian identity.”
(In reality, this is again just a Persian identity.) Such a statement cannot apply to a Turk, Arab, or Kurd, because without a shared language — and when the Persian refuses to speak the other’s language — there can be no identity bond allowing them to say, “My identity is Iranian.” It is clear that what he means is assimilated Arabs, Kurds, Baloch, and Turks — Azerified, Kurdified, Baluchified…
Video link, first video from minute 30
Video link, second video from minute 51
*3 – Statements by Mohammad Reza Nikfar, writer residing in the Netherlands:
“Islam in the Secular Future of Iran” (2019)
Topics: 1- New Shiism, 2- The Turk–Persian Question, 3- The Azerbaijan Question.
*4 – Analytical Statement: “Do Not Shoot at the People’s Aspirations!”
Original statement
Critique of the statement — Umud Duzgun:
Critique article
ANTV interview — Critique of the statement and the Kurdish issue:
YouTube link
*5 – The Iran-Shahri Philosophy is, in essence, the same as the ideology of Pan-Persianism of the Persian minority. Because it cannot expand on its own, it uses the name “Iranian-ness” to cover the non-Persian nations under its rule, in order to artificially enlarge its geographical domain — employing identity-sold-out agents from other nationalities, such as Seyed Hasan Taqizadeh, Taqi Arani, and Seyed Javad Tabatabaei.
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Mohsen Mehralizadeh, reformist candidate in the 9th presidential election (sixth place), current head of the Zurkhaneh Sports Federation, and chairman of the board of Asia Water Development Company, implementing the project to desalinate and transfer water from the Arabian Gulf to Persian-majority areas like Kerman and Yazd.
*6 – See:
Anatomy of the Deceptive Nature of the Regime’s Mehran Behari Network — Umud Duzgun
The “Integration” Theory in Iran and the Turk–Persian Confrontation
This video shows a slice of the theory-making against the Azerbaijani Turk nation that has been formulated in the Persian fascism think tank. The speaker is one of the “repentant” Persian communist leftists, Mohammad Reza Nikfar, who—after seeing (a “sign of God”) Khomeini in the moon and then fleeing from the terror of Khomeini’s spirit—lost his way instead of going to Cuba or North Korea and popped up from under the basket of the Western bourgeoisie. For several years now, under the pretext of promoting democracy, he has been abusing the Dutch government’s aid and subsidies—pocketing the money of Dutch taxpayers and petty bourgeois—without any useful service to the host society, to advertise Pan-Persianism and rescue the century-old Persian fascist system in dark think tanks, under the cover of Radio Zamaneh, doing what he himself calls “media work”!
Because Persian fascism’s project to homogenize the non-Persian nations over the past hundred years has failed and the theory of assimilation—“one nation, one identity, one language”—has not worked, they are searching for new theories with deceptive and populist slogans, and to advance their racist and fascist aims they have again made the Azerbaijani Turk nation their first target. (From minute 17 of the video.) Referring to the insufficient results from the betrayals of Seyyed Ahmad Kasravi (a manqurt Turk) against his own nation, he seems to be looking for a new anti-Turk theory and new Turk traitors (manqurts).
Over the past 20 years, the right and left wings of Persian fascism—under various titles such as citizens’ rights, democracy, secularism, the right of nations to self-determination (provided that right is not used), economic or geographic/provincial federalism, ethnic federalism (without providing military guarantees), self-rule, a decentralized republican system, a Leninist socialist system even with the right to secession (on paper but keeping it silent forever), and the like—have sought to save the collapsing structure of Persian fascism after the overthrow of today’s Persian-Shiite Shuʿubist fascist regime. To push their aims forward, they have tried to deceive some national activists of the Azerbaijani national movement and use them as a trigger. Fortunately, from a theoretical standpoint the Azerbaijani national movement is so strong and firm that it has managed to repel all their plots. And the few who were fooled by the promises of the Transition Management Council and one or two other suspicious circles quickly realized their double-dealing in the name of democracy and exposed the filthy tricks of Persian fascism. Even so, Persian fascism still continues, behind the mask of democracy, to devise theories and impose its own alternative to preserve the racist and fascist hegemony of the Persian minority. The Persian fascism think tank must know that if it does not sit in its place, the fate of the Serbian fascists of Yugoslavia awaits it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1605&v=gCx3TQ8svcM&fbclid=IwAR2sfiyUr1ZPN5lTiDQRHWwVYrJikaVeC3jZk1rY6TVmeGSNHsZ8gc5oogw
İnteqrasiya teorisi və Türk–Fars qarşı durması (Azerbaijani)
Keçən 100 ildə, Fars faşizmi Azərbaycan Türk millətinə qarşı yaratdığı nəzəriyyələr əsasında istədikləri nəticəni ala bilmədiklərinə rəğmən, özlərindən getmirlər və durmadan müxtəlif görünümlərdə yeni nəzəriyyələr yaratmağa cəhd edirlər. Bu video klipdə 17-inci dəqiqədə inteqrasiya teorisindən və Türk–Fars qarşı durmasından söhbət aparırlar!
Keçən 20 ildə müxtəlif sağ və sol Fars faşizmini təmsil edən siyasi qruplar bu nəzəriyyələr əsasında: vətəndaşlıq hüququ, demokratiya, sekulyarizm, özünü-idarə hüququ, mədəni muxtariyyət, mərkəzləşmənin olmaması, iqtisadi federallıq, əyalət federallığı, “millətlərin öz müqəddəratını təyin etmə hüququ”nun olması – amma ondan istifadə etmədən, hətta “millətlərin ayrılma hüququ”nun kağız üzərində olması – amma ondan heç söz açmamaq və aradakı müxtəlif aldatmacalar və s. ilə...
İstəyiblər Azərbaycan milli fəallarını aldadıb və onları Fars faşizminə maşa olaraq kullansınlar. Amma Azərbaycan milli hərəkəti nəzəri baxımdan o qədər güclüdür ki, onların hamısına dəf olunub və onların toruna düşən 2–3 nəfər də peşiman olub Fars faşizminin kəskin hiylələrini ifşa ediblər. Buna baxmayaraq, Fars faşizmi demokratiya maskası altında yeni alternativ nəzəriyyələr yaratmalarına davam etməkdədirlər. Amma bu dəfə Seyyed Əhməd Kəsrəvi, Həsən Təqizadə və Təqi Ərani kimi manqurtları tapsalar belə, onları maşa kimi bizim millətin gözünə soxa bilməyəcəklər.
The necessity of efforts to standardize the alphabets and orthography of mother tongues with the Persian contact language
Yusef Kor, a Turkmen national activist and supporter of a federal Iran, who also has a record of cooperation with the Persian communist Fedayeen-e Khalq, writes in an article in Iran Global (September 2020):
“The necessity of striving to harmonize the alphabets and methods of writing of the mother tongues with the Persian contact language in Iran is inescapable.
A review of measures implemented in many countries—including the Soviet Union and the European Union—shows that strengthening the union of peoples in multilingual and multicultural countries requires, on the one hand, efforts to increase and reinforce commonalities in the domain of orthography, and on the other hand efforts, as far as possible, to reduce differences in that domain. This work increases understanding and trust among the various ethnicities and nationalities in Iran. To provide the grounds for acceptance of the claim being made, it is necessary… The addition of extra letters to create the alphabet and orthography of the Persian language has been limited only to four consonants; its failure to be ‘updated’ in the 21st century still continues.”
In reality, knowingly or unknowingly, he has become a fuel-carrier for Pan-Persianism, speeding up the linguistic and cultural assimilation machine of the non-Persian nations and the equalization and dissolution of those languages into the imposed Persian language—and he is helping Ataollah Hoodashtian’s theory of “creating a hybrid Turkic–Persian language.”
Of course, the regime has not sat idle either, and has propagated the “Azari” language in Azerbaijan.
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