Opinion Piece: By Umud Duzgun

Iran’ s Protests and the Unknown Outlook

A Position of Responsibility in a Time of Manufactured Alternatives

Given the current developments inside Iran, some friends have encouraged me to express my views publicly — either through television appearances, which I have long boycotted, or through new articles. I have chosen not to do so, not out of indifference, but for concrete and well-considered reasons. These include the absence of a credible and independent platform, the lack of meaningful support, and the erosion of genuine influence within the leadership of protest movements inside Azerbaijan.

At the same time, my position has never changed on a fundamental point: Azerbaijanis must resist the Iranian regime and bring their collective national will into the public sphere with their own slogans, priorities, and demands. Except in cases where demonstrations in Tabriz and other Azerbaijani cities were hijacked or manipulated by Persian-centric forces, I have consistently supported protest, resistance, and participation as historical necessities.

However, today’s conditions are far more complex and dangerous. The trajectory of protests is increasingly being shaped — directly or indirectly — by the regime itself, in parallel with the political rehabilitation of Reza Pahlavi through wealthy networks and satellite media. This circle includes influential figures with reformist ties to the regime and a deeply entrenched pan-Persian ideology that is hostile to Turks, Arabs, and other non-Persian nations. Replacing the current dictatorship with a restored version of the former one would not serve the people of Iran; on the contrary, it would objectively benefit the Islamic Republic by reproducing the same structures of exclusion and repression under a different banner.

History is unequivocal on one point: without Azerbaijani participation and uprising, no revolutionary movement in Iran has ever succeeded. In this contradictory moment, Azerbaijan’s silence works in the regime’s favor. Yet participation under imposed leadership or hijacked symbolism would be equally destructive. While there is a growing risk that Azerbaijani mobilization could be absorbed or neutralized by the Pahlavi project — a process in which the regime itself appears to play a covert role — it must also be stated clearly that South Azerbaijanis harbor deep resentment toward the Pahlavi family and its legacy of dictatorship.

Reza Pahlavi has no genuine social base inside Iran. His visibility stems not from popular legitimacy but from financial resources, constant promotion by satellite media, and support from limited circles within the U.S. Congress and government. Israel’s open endorsement and Washington’s implicit backing of a figure so widely rejected inside Iran only deepen mistrust. Similarly alarming is the continued support by some American political actors for the Mujahedin-e-Khalq — an organization associated with violence, collaboration with Saddam Hussein, and sectarian isolation, and one that lacks credibility even among Persian speakers.

History shows that imposing hated and illegitimate alternatives on a society leads not to stability, but to uncontrollable civil war. Any externally engineered plan — whether framed as a “Delta model” or a transactional deal between foreign powers and internal elites — would collapse within weeks. Its consequences would be catastrophic: regional escalation involving Russia, Turkey, and Arab states; inter-ethnic conflict; and violent power struggles within Iran itself.

As I argued in an article written in 1997, the least costly and most realistic path forward is not regime replacement but regime collapse — similar to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This would entail the disintegration of Iran’s centralized power structure, followed by the peaceful reorganization of regions along national and ethnic lines and the negotiated declaration of independence by new political entities. While far from ideal, this scenario offers the greatest chance to reduce mass bloodshed and prevent prolonged civil war.

After forty-eight years of struggle, experience has revealed many blind spots that policymakers continue to ignore. I believe these insights could still be of value to serious research centers and decision-makers, should there be genuine interest in preventing catastrophe rather than managing chaos. Until such space exists, I choose to focus on writing, documentation, and intellectual work — quietly, responsibly, and without contributing to illusions that history has already discredited.

Umud Düzgün

January 7, 2026