اومود دوٌزگوٌن
The National Question: Why the Disintegration of Iran?
Written: December 2003 – Translated and Revised: 2025
By Umud Duzgun
Introduction
The issue of the Iranian state's future, and the likelihood of its disintegration, is no longer just a topic for political theorists or a taboo in official discourse. In recent years, both political elites and civil society have increasingly faced a question that can no longer be suppressed: Can Iran continue to exist in its current form, and if so, for how long? This article, first written in December 2003, aimed to bring that question to the public arena long before it became part of mainstream debates. I argued then—as I do now—that the disintegration of Iran is not only possible but likely. And this is not due to the wishes of a few separatists, but because of structural, historical, and political contradictions that make the existing unitary state untenable.
When this article was first published, some labeled me a foreign agent or accused me of trying to create ethnic discord. Yet everything I wrote then has gradually entered the national conversation, albeit under different names—federalism, decentralization, multiculturalism, and even ethnic autonomy. In this updated version, I clarify those early arguments and expand on why the Iranian state, as currently constituted, is on an unsustainable path.
I. The Structural Nature of the Iranian State
Iran is not a nation-state in the classical sense, but rather a multiethnic, multinational state. Yet the Iranian government has historically denied this fact, enforcing a model of forced assimilation and Persianization under the banner of nationalism. This artificial nationalism, based on one language, one history, and one identity, has always been in tension with the actual social reality of the country. The state's refusal to recognize its multinational composition has prevented the development of an inclusive civic identity, leaving millions of non-Persian citizens alienated.
This is not merely a matter of cultural rights. It is political and structural. The Persian-dominated central government rules over diverse regions—South Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Balochistan, Khuzestan, and others—often treating them as internal colonies. Resources are extracted from the peripheries to enrich the center. Local identities are suppressed in the name of national unity. The result is not cohesion but growing resistance.
II. Nation-Building Without a Nation
One of the great paradoxes of Iran is that it attempts nation-building without having achieved a unified national identity. While many modern states have used cultural assimilation to create unity—often through education, media, and administrative integration—Iran has failed to do so because its foundation lacks consent. Rather than inviting non-Persian groups to participate in a shared national project, it has imposed an identity upon them.
This model of denial is similar to the Serb rule during Yugoslavia's last few years, when the central government imposed fascist ideology while other national movements in other regions gained strength. Like the Serbs, the Iranian regime today finds itself confronted with growing demands for autonomy, cultural recognition, and increasingly independence. The more it suppresses these demands, the stronger they become.
III. The Illusion of Reform and the Centralist Trap
For the past two decades, reformist politicians have promised to fix the Iranian system from within. Yet even under their governance, the centralist model has remained untouched. The reform movement has never offered a serious program to address the national question. On the contrary, many reformists—while critical of the clerical regime—share the same Persian-centric worldview as the conservatives. For them, "Iran" is synonymous with Persian culture, and they see the assertion of non-Persian identities as a threat to national security.
This blindness has cost them legitimacy in non-Persian regions. People in South Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and elsewhere do not simply want more representation in Tehran. They want local self-rule, control over their resources, and the right to preserve and develop their languages and cultures. The reformist movement, by ignoring these demands, has proven itself incapable of offering a viable future for the country as a whole.
IV. A Crisis of Legitimacy
The Iranian state today faces a legitimacy crisis on multiple fronts: ideological, economic, and national. Its Islamic identity, once its strongest pillar, is now rejected by a large portion of the population. Its economic model has produced inequality, inflation, and corruption. But perhaps most fatally, its refusal to embrace the country's multinational reality has alienated large segments of society.
This is not just a failure of policy—it is a failure of imagination. The ruling elite cannot envision a democratic, decentralized, or plurinational future. They continue to cling to an outdated model of top-down Persian nationalism, backed by military force and religious ideology. This has placed the state in a permanent state of internal conflict. Every protest, every demand for language rights or local governance, is treated as a threat to the integrity of the state. But it is this very repression that is accelerating the disintegration.
V. The Way Forward: From Disintegration to Reconfiguration
Disintegration need not be violent. The breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia offers different models—some peaceful, some tragic. What determines the outcome is not whether disintegration occurs, but how it is managed. Iran can either transition into a decentralized, democratic confederation of nations, or face an eventual collapse under the weight of its contradictions.
The key lies in accepting that national self-determination is not a threat, but a right. South Azerbaijan, like other regions, should have the right to decide its future—whether within a reconfigured Iran or as an independent entity. What matters is that this decision be made through democratic means, with the consent of the people.
In this sense, disintegration is not necessarily the end of Iran—it could be the beginning of a new political reality in the region. A reality based not on forced unity, but on voluntary association and mutual respect.
Conclusion
When I wrote this article in 2003, few were ready to hear these ideas. Today, they are part of everyday political discourse in Iran and among its diaspora. The questions I raised then remain urgent: Who owns the Iranian state? Who defines its identity? And who gets to decide its future?
We must not be afraid of the answers. The future will be shaped by those who dare to ask the questions that others fear.
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مسئله ملی: چرا تجزیه ایران؟
نوشته شده: دسامبر ۲۰۰۳ - ترجمه و بازنگری: ژوئن ۲۰۲۵ نوشته امید دوزگون مقدمه مسئله آینده دولت ایران و احتمال تجزیه آن، دیگر فقط موضوعی برای نظریه‌پردازان سیاسی یا تابو در گفتمان رسمی نیست. در سال‌های اخیر، هم نخبگان سیاسی و هم جامعه مدنی به طور فزاینده‌ای با سؤالی روبرو شده‌اند که دیگر نمی‌توان آن را سرکوب کرد: آیا ایران می‌تواند به شکل فعلی خود ادامه دهد و اگر چنین است، تا چه مدت؟ این مقاله که اولین بار در دسامبر ۲۰۰۳ نوشته شد، قصد داشت این سؤال را مدت‌ها قبل از اینکه بخشی از بحث‌های جریان اصلی شود، به عرصه عمومی بیاورد. من در آن زمان - همانطور که اکنون استدلال می‌کنم - استدلال کردم که تجزیه ایران نه تنها ممکن است، بلکه محتمل است. و این به دلیل خواسته‌های چند جدایی‌طلب نیست، بلکه به دلیل تناقضات ساختاری، تاریخی و سیاسی است که دولت واحد موجود را غیرقابل دفاع میکند. وقتی این مقاله برای اولین بار منتشر شد، برخی مرا عامل خارجی خواندند یا مرا به تلاش برای ایجاد اختلاف قومی متهم کردند. با این حال، هر آنچه که در آن زمان نوشتم، به تدریج وارد گفتگوی ملی شده است، البته با نام‌های مختلف - فدرالیسم، تمرکززدایی، چندفرهنگی‌گرایی و حتی خودمختاری قومی. در این نسخه به‌روز شده، آن استدلال‌های اولیه را روشن می‌کنم و توضیح می‌دهم که چرا دولت ایران، آنطور که در حال حاضر تشکیل شده است، در مسیری ناپایدار قرار دارد. ۱. ماهیت ساختاری دولت ایران ایران یک دولت-ملت به معنای کلاسیک آن نیست، بلکه یک دولت چند قومی و چند ملیتی است. با این حال، دولت ایران از نظر تاریخی این واقعیت را انکار کرده و مدلی از جذب اجباری و فارسی‌سازی را تحت عنوان ملی‌گرایی اجرا کرده است. این ملی‌گرایی مصنوعی، مبتنی بر یک زبان، یک تاریخ و یک هویت، همیشه با واقعیت اجتماعی واقعی کشور در تنش بوده است. امتناع دولت از به رسمیت شناختن ترکیب چند ملیتی آن، مانع از توسعه یک هویت مدنی فراگیر شده و میلیون‌ها شهروند غیر فارس را بیگانه گذاشته است. این صرفاً مسئله حقوق فرهنگی نیست. این مسئله سیاسی و ساختاری است. دولت مرکزی تحت سلطه فارس‌ها بر مناطق متنوعی - آذربایجان جنوبی، کردستان، بلوچستان، خوزستان و سایر مناطق - حکومت میکند و اغلب با آنها به عنوان مستعمرات داخلی رفتار میکند. منابع از مناطق پیرامونی استخراج می‌شوند تا مرکز را غنی‌تر کنند. هویت‌های محلی به نام وحدت ملی سرکوب می‌شوند. نتیجه نه انسجام، بلکه مقاومت فزاینده است. دوم. ملت‌سازی بدون ملت یکی از پارادوکس‌های بزرگ ایران این است که بدون دستیابی به یک هویت ملی واحد، تلاش میکند ملت‌سازی کند. در حالی که بسیاری از کشورهای مدرن از جذب فرهنگی برای ایجاد وحدت - اغلب از طریق آموزش، رسانه و ادغام اداری - استفاده کرده‌اند، ایران در این کار شکست خورده است زیرا پایه و اساس آن فاقد رضایت است. به جای دعوت از گروه‌های غیر فارس برای شرکت در یک پروژه ملی مشترک، هویتی را به آنها تحمیل کرده است. این مدل از انکار شبیه به حکومت صربها در چند سال آخر یوگسلاوی است، زمانی که دولت مرکزی ایدئولوژی فاشیستی را تحمیل کرد در حالی که سایر جنبشهای ملی در مناطق دیگر قدرت می‌گرفتند. رژیم ایران مانند صربها، امروز خود را با تقاضاهای فزاینده برای خودمختاری، به رسمیت شناختن فرهنگی و استقلال فزاینده مواجه می‌بیند. هر چه بیشتر این خواسته‌ها را سرکوب کند، قوی‌تر می‌شوند.
