Rejim Dəyişməsindən Kənar: İran Niyə

Kosmetik Rejim Dəyişməsinə Deyil,

Struktur Transformasiyasına Ehtiyac

Duyur

Müəllif: Umud Düzgün

01 Fevral 2026

İranın siyasi böhranı adətən diktatura ilə demokratiya arasında bir mübarizə kimi çərçivələndirilir.

Bu çərçivə emosional baxımdan cəlbedici olsa da, analitik baxımdan natamamdır və nəticə

etibarilə yanıltıcıdır. Əsas problem yalnız İslam Respublikası deyil, İran dövlətinin öz struktur

arxitekturasıdır — farsçılıq və şiəlik üzərində qurulmuş və bir əsrdən artıq müddət ərzində razılıq

deyil, məcburiyyət vasitəsilə davam etdirilmiş mərkəzləşdirilmiş bir sistem.

Onilliklər boyu davam edən kütləvi etirazlar qeyri-adi cəsarət nümayiş etdirmişdir, lakin onlar

davamlı şəkildə sistemli dəyişiklik yarada bilməmişdir. İslahatçı siyasət institusional veto gücü

qarşısında dəfələrlə iflasa uğramışdır. Eyni zamanda, hərbi zərbələr, rejimin başının kəsilməsi

və ya xaricdən tətbiq olunan alternativ hökumətlər kimi təkliflər təhlükəli dərəcədə sadəlövhdür.

Reallıq açıqdır: təkcə rejim dəyişikliyi İranın böhranını həll etməyəcək.

Tıxanmış Keçid, Üzvi Demokratik Uğursuzluq Deyil

İran tarixən demokratik inkişaf qabiliyyətindən məhrum olmamışdır. Onun konstitusion inkişaf

trayektoriyası Britaniya və Rusiya müdaxilələri ilə kəsilmişdir; bu müdaxilələr islahatçı elitaları və

konstitusion institutları zəiflətmiş, nəticədə 1921–1925-ci illər arasında avtoritar dövlətin

formalaşmasına zəmin yaratmışdır.

Bu, sadəcə rejim dəyişikliyi deyil, dövlətin struktur transformasiyası idi — yarı-federal Qacar

sistemindən mərkəzləşdirilmiş Pəhləvi monarxiyasına keçid. Konstitusionizmi dərinləşdirmək

əvəzinə, Pəhləvi rejimi parlament siyasətini dağıtdı, mətbuatı və siyasi partiyaları sıxışdırdı və

dövləti fars-mərkəzli, unitar, siyasi plüralizmə, dil müxtəlifliyinə və qeyri-fars kimliklərinə düşmən

olan bir quruluşa yenidən formalaşdırdı.

İslam Respublikası bu arxitekturanı dağıtmadı; onu miras aldı, institusionallaşdırdı və daha da

gücləndirdi.

Niyə İslahat Struktur Baxımından Mümkün Deyil

İslam Respublikası struktur olaraq islah edilə bilməz, çünki onun yaşaması mərkəzləşdirilmiş

hakimiyyətə, ideoloji uyğunluğa, dil basqısına və məcburi assimilyasiyaya bağlıdır. Bunlar

siyasət səhvləri və ya düzəldilə bilən qüsurlar deyil; bunlar dövlətin özünün fundamental

tələbləridir. Hər hansı həqiqi demokratikləşmə mütləq olaraq hakimiyyətin həyata keçirildiyi bu

mexanizmləri dağıdacaqdır və bu səbəbdən islahatçı diskurs sadəcə təsirsiz deyil, daxili

ziddiyyətlidir.

Daha da önəmlisi, İslam Respublikasının aradan qaldırılması avtomatik olaraq demokratiya

yaratmayacaqdır. İran dövlətinin avtoritar məntiqi mövcud rejimdən əvvəl mövcud olmuş və yüz

ildən artıq müddət ərzində davam etmişdir. Eyni struktur çərçivəsində fəaliyyət göstərən

istənilən post-İslam Respublikası hökuməti — istər nominal olaraq respublikaçı, sekulyar və ya

monarxist olsun — çox böyük ehtimalla eyni avtoritarizmi başqa terminologiya altında təkrar

istehsal edəcək, yenə də fars-mərkəzli, şiə yönümlü və qeyri-fars xalqlara və qeyri-şiə icmalara

qarşı düşmən olaraq qalacaqdır.

Vahid Demokratik İran Mifi

İran homogen milli dövlət deyil, fars-mərkəzli və şiə-mərkəzli dövlət strukturu vasitəsilə idarə

olunan çoxmillətli siyasi qurumdur. Türklər, kürdlər, ərəblər, bəluclar və digər qeyri-fars xalqlar

əhalinin əhəmiyyətli hissəsini — hətta demoqrafik əksəriyyətini təşkil edir — lakin onlar sistemli

şəkildə bərabər siyasi iştirakdan və dövlət hakimiyyətinə real çıxışdan kənarda saxlanılmışdır.

Bu struktur əsas dəyişdirilmədən və etibarlı təhlükəsizlik təminatları, icra oluna bilən institusional

mexanizmlər və real demokratik elitalar olmadan həyata keçirilən demokratikləşmə cəhdləri,

nəticədə bərabərsizliyi demokratik ritorika altında seçki mexanizmləri vasitəsilə yenidən istehsal

edir. Belə şəraitdə seçkilər azadlıq vasitəsi deyil, mövcud iyerarxiyaların idarə olunan şəkildə

davam etdirilməsi alətinə çevrilir.

Müxalif qruplar tərəfindən tez-tez həll yolu kimi irəli sürülən federalizm bu ziddiyyəti təkbaşına

aradan qaldıra bilməz. Dərin mərkəzləşmiş və tarixi olaraq iyerarxik siyasi mədəniyyət daxilində

federalizm sadəcə inzibati desentralizasiya ilə nəticələnə bilər və real hakimiyyət bölgüsü,

suverenlik və milli plürallığın tanınması olmadan boş bir formaya çevrilə bilər. Bu isə dominantlıq

strukturlarını dağıtmaq əvəzinə onları yeni institusional etiket altında möhkəmləndirə bilər.

Bu səbəbdən İran vahid demokratik milli dövlət kimi deyil, mərkəzləşdirilmiş və şaquli iyerarxik

sistemlə idarə olunan çoxmillətli siyasi məkan kimi başa düşülməlidir. Dövlətin struktur əsaslarını

dəyişdirməyən hər hansı demokratikləşmə layihəsi bərabərsizliyi aradan qaldırmaq əvəzinə onu

təkrar istehsal etməyə məhkumdur.

Dövlət Kimliyi: Farsçılıq və Şiəlik Struktur Təməllər Kimi

Müasir İran dövlətinin kimliyi farsçılıq və şiəlik üzərində qurulmuşdur. Bu quruluş İslam

Respublikası ilə başlamamışdır; Pəhləvi dövründə institusionallaşdırılmış və bu gün də davam

edir. Zamanla fars millətçiliyi ilə dini ideologiya arasında balans dəyişsə də, istisnaedici məntiq

sabit qalmışdır.

Dil qadağaları, mədəni assimilyasiya, qeyri-fars xalqlara qarşı diskriminasiya və alternativ

kimliklərin basqılanması istisna deyil, sistemin özünün xüsusiyyətləridir. Hətta mühacirətdə olan

bir çox İranlı elitlər belə onilliklər boyu institusionallaşmış avtoritarizmin nəticəsi olaraq bu

davranış modellərini təkrar istehsal edir. Bu irs İranın mövcud çərçivəsində həqiqətən plüralist

və demokratik bir dövlətin yaranmasını son dərəcə çətinləşdirir.

Niyə Hərbi Həllər Uğursuz Olacaq

Bəzi siyasətçilər rejimi zəiflətmək və ya devirmək üçün məhdud hərbi müdaxilə və ya “cərrahi

zərbələr” təklif edirlər. Bu yanaşma İranın daxili milli parçalanmalarını nəzərə almır. Hərbi “baş

kəsmə” hakimiyyətin parçalanmasına, silahlı milislərin güclənməsinə, etnik gərginliklərin

artmasına və vətəndaş müharibəsi riskinin yüksəlməsinə səbəb olacaqdır. Pəhləvi

monarxiyasının bərpası və ya hər hansı fars-mərkəzli alternativ rejimin tətbiqi böyük ehtimalla

uzunmüddətli qeyri-sabitliyə gətirib çıxaracaqdır.

İraq modeli nə realdır, nə də arzuolunandır. Belə bir müdaxilə legitimlik yaratmaq əvəzinə

müqavimət doğuracaq və böyük insan və siyasi xərclərə səbəb olacaqdır.

Sovet Presedenti: Real və Mümkün Alternativ

Zorakı dövlət çöküşünə alternativ olaraq daha real və daha az dağıdıcı model Sovet İttifaqı tipli

razılaşdırılmış transformasiyadır. Bu model İran üçün tətbiq edilərsə, beynəlxalq vasitəçilik,

İranın çoxmillətli siyasi məkan kimi tanınması və öz müqəddəratını təyinetmə üzrə beynəlxalq

nəzarət altında referendumlar tələb edəcəkdir. Bundan sonra sərhədlər və yeni dövlət institutları

danışıqlar yolu ilə müəyyənləşdiriləcəkdir. Siyasi legitimlik məcburiyyətdən deyil, razılıqdan

qaynaqlanacaqdır.

Sovet İttifaqının dağılması avtomatik olaraq xaos demək deyildi. İraq, Suriya və Liviya ilə

müqayisədə bu proses daha az zorakı, daha az xərcli və daha sabit oldu. Məcburi birlik

razılaşdırılmış ayrılıqla əvəz olundu. Əgər İranın mərkəzləşdirilmiş sistemi dağılarsa, müxtəlif

xalqların müstəqillik istəyi qaçılmaz olacaqdır. Bu təhlükə deyil, siyasi reallıqdır. Əsas sual

parçalanmanın olub-olmaması deyil, onun danışıqlar yolu ilə, yoxsa münaqişə yolu ilə baş

verməsidir. Yalnız birinci variant sülh yolu ilə keçidi mümkün edir.

ABŞ və Beynəlxalq Siyasətçilər üçün Nəticələr

Vaşinqton üçün mərkəzləşdirilmiş İran dövlətinin qorunmasına sərmayə qoymaq onun

dağılmasına sərmayə qoymaq qədər riskli ola bilər. Qeyri-fars xalqlar şiə-mərkəzli diktaturadan

fars-mərkəzli millətçi rejimə keçidi qəbul etməyəcəkdir. Xaricdən tətbiq olunan və ya

fars-mərkəzli istənilən alternativ rejim uzunmüddətli münaqişələrə səbəb olacaqdır.

Buna görə də İranın demoqrafik reallıqlarını qəbul edən və bütün xalqlarla bərabər şəkildə

məsləhətləşən yeni yanaşma tələb olunur. 1989–1991-ci illərdə Sovet İttifaqının dağılması

göstərir ki, razılaşdırılmış parçalanma, referendumlar və beynəlxalq nəzarət altında keçidlər

həm iqtisadi baxımdan səmərəli, həm də sabitləşdirici ola bilər.

Regional və Geosiyasi Ölçü

İranın böhranı ABŞ, Avropa, Rusiya, Çin, İsrail, Türkiyə və ərəb ölkələri arasındakı geosiyasi

rəqabətdən ayrı düşünülə bilməz. Bu aktorların maraqları tez-tez İranın mərkəzləşdirilmiş

strukturunun qorunması ətrafında kəsişmişdir. Lakin süni birliklərin qorunması təkrar-təkrar

basqı, üsyan və regional qeyri-sabitlik yaratmışdır.

İrandan Sonra: Qeyri-Bərabər Demokratiya və

Post-İmperial Keçid

İrandan sonrakı keçid nə dramatik, nə də vahid olacaqdır, lakin gözlənildiyindən daha

idarəolunan və daha az zorakı ola bilər. Sovet İttifaqından sonra yaranan 15 dövlət və

Yuqoslaviyadan sonra yaranan 7 dövlət göstərir ki, siyasi parçalanma avtomatik olaraq xaosa

gətirib çıxarmır. Bu dövlətlərin heç biri dərhal Qərb tipli liberal demokratiya olmayacaqdır.

Bəziləri yarı-demokratik və ya millətçi sistemlər quracaq, digərləri isə çətinliklərlə üzləşəcəkdir.

Lakin tarix göstərir ki, kiçik özünüidarə edən dövlətlər böyük çoxmillətli imperiyalara nisbətən

daha hesabatlı, daha az imperial və daha asan islahat edilə biləndir.

Bu potensial dövlətlər arasında Güney Azərbaycan daha yüksək demokratik perspektivlərə

malikdir — tarixi idarəçilik təcrübəsi, konstitusion siyasətdə iştirakı, Türkiyədəki demokratik

modellərlə mədəni yaxınlığı və Quzey Azərbaycanın keçid təcrübəsi səbəbilə.

Paradoksal olaraq, yalnız İran dövlətinin parçalanması ilə fars cəmiyyəti də avtoritarizmin təkrar

istehsalı dövründən qurtula bilər. Ərazi bütövlüyünü hər şeydən üstün tutmaq siyasəti nə

sabitlik, nə də demokratiya gətirmişdir — yalnız təkrar basqı və üsyanlar yaratmışdır. Seçim

birlik və xaos arasında deyil, məcburiyyət və razılıq arasındadır.

Nəticə

Əgər beynəlxalq ictimaiyyət İranın ərazi bütövlüyünü xalqların hüquqlarından üstün tutmağa

davam edərsə, bu, avtoritarizmi və təkrar üsyanları davam etdirəcəkdir. Sovet tipli razılaşdırılmış

struktur transformasiyası daha real, daha az zorakı və daha demokratik bir yol təqdim edir.

İranın gələcəyi yalnız rejim dəyişikliyində deyil, siyasi hakimiyyətin yenidən qurulmasındadır.

Yalnız xalqların öz müqəddəratını təyinetməsi vasitəsilə davamlı sülh, legitimlik və demokratik

idarəçilik mümkündür. Əsas seçim birlik və xaos arasında deyil, məcburiyyət və razılıq

arasındadır.

____*****_____

Əlavə / Dipnotun Genişləndirilməsi

XIX əsrin sonlarına doğru Britaniya strateji düşüncəsi Qacar İmperiyasına artıq təkcə suveren

bir dövlət kimi deyil, Osmanlı İmperiyasının şərq arxa cəbhəsini zəiflətmək və bölgədə başqa bir

vahid türk gücünün (Qacar Türklərinin) meydana çıxmasının qarşısını almaq üçün nəzərdə

tutulmuş bir tampon zona kimi baxmağa başladı. Dolayı təsirin İranın siyasi və iqtisadi

mənzərəsini yenidən təşkil etməyə artıq başladığına baxmayaraq, Britaniyanın tam nəzarət

üçün atdığı addım 1919-cu ildə Anglo-Pers (İngiltərə–Fars) Müqaviləsi ilə kulminasiya nöqtəsinə

çatdı. Bu müqavilə beynəlxalq aləmdə — xüsusilə də Amerika Birləşmiş Ştatları tərəfindən —

İranın suverenliyini əlindən alacaq müstəmləkəçi bir pakt kimi geniş şəkildə qınandı.

İranın Britaniya protektoratı statusunu rəsmiləşdirmək məqsədi daşıyan bu razılaşma, son

nəticədə, ölkə daxilində geniş milli qəzəb dalğası və Qacarların son hökmdarı Əhməd Şahın

inadkar mövqeyi səbəbilə uğursuz oldu; onun Londonda nümayiş etdirdiyi simvolik “müqavimət”

həm müqavilənin, həm də öz sülaləsinin taleyini möhürlədi. Bu açıq manevrin iflası Britaniya

strateqlərini inandırdı ki, mövcud Qacar strukturu geri dönməz dərəcədə kövrəkdir; beləliklə,

yeni və itaətkar bir siyasi sistemin layihələndirilməsi üçün daha həlledici müdaxiləyə zəmin

yarandı. Aşağıdakı analiz məhz bu kritik dönəcdən sonra formalaşan beş mərhələli Britaniya

“quruluşunu” (set-up) izləyir: dolayı nəzarət mexanizmləri vasitəsilə, əməkdaşlıq etməyən türk

konstitusion monarxiyasını Britaniyanın həlledici təsiri altında, yüksək dərəcədə

mərkəzləşdirilmiş, fars-mərkəzli avtoritar monarxiya ilə əvəzləməyə yönəlmiş hesablanmış bir

proses.

Aşağıda təqdim olunanlar yekun bir tarixi hökm deyil, daha çox əlavə arxiv araşdırmalarına

ehtiyac duyan işlək bir hipotezdir. Bu hipotez mənim “The Persia Question” (“Persiya Sualları”)

adlı kitabımın bir hissəsində daha əvvəl irəli sürülmüş arqumentlərə, xüsusən XIX əsrin sonu və

XX əsrin əvvəllərində İran dövlətinin xaricdən strukturlaşdırılması məsələsinə söykənir və

müasir İran tarixini beş kritik mərhələ vasitəsilə şərh edir; bu mərhələlərdə dövlət plüralizmə

düşmən olan mərkəzləşdirilmiş, unitar bir sistemə yenidən dizayn edilmişdir:

Faza 1 (1920-ci illərin əvvəli): “Françayz” Modeli Qurulur

Britaniya öz müstəmləkə maraqlarını (xüsusən nefti) təmin etmək üçün Rza xanın yüksəlişini

təşkil etdi. Nəticədə yaranan Pəhləvi dövləti suveren bir qurum kimi deyil, nəzarət edilən

müştəri-dövlət “françayzı” kimi strukturlaşdırıldı — sanki bir biznes filialı: yerli “sahib” (Şah) əsas

sistemi (xarici siyasət, resurs nəzarəti) dəyişdirmək gücünə malik deyildi. 1921 çevrilişi və bunun

ardınca Anglo-Pers Oil Company-yə (Anglo-Pers Neft Şirkətinə) 100 illik neft güzəşti bu

arxitekturanı möhkəmləndirdi.

Faza 2 (1944): Struktur Müdafiə Olunur

Müttəfiq güclər (ABŞ, SSRİ) İranın Almaniyaya meyilli xəttini dəyişmək və Rza Şahdan sonra

potensial olaraq Qacar çərçivəsini bərpa etmək istədikdə, Britaniya buna uğurla müqavimət

göstərdi. O, hakimiyyətin yeni bir sistemə deyil, françayzın “varisinə” — 22 yaşlı Məhəmməd

Rza Pəhləviyə keçməsini təmin etdi və ilkin quruluşu qorudu.

Faza 3 (1953): Struktur Zorla Tətbiq Edilir

Baş nazir Müsəddiqin nefti milliləşdirmək və suverenliyi bərpa etmək cəhdi bu struktur üçün

birbaşa təhdid idi. ABŞ tərəfinin ilkin açıq mövqeyinə baxmayaraq, sonda Britaniya təzyiqi üstün

gəldi. ABŞ dəstəyini geri çəkdi və birgə əməliyyat İranın demokratik təcrübəsini dağıtdı və

Pəhləvi sistemini yenilənmiş avtoritar güclə yenidən bərpa etdi.

Faza 4 (1979): Struktur Sökülmür, Uyğunlaşdırılır

1979 inqilabının ardından İslam Respublikası Britaniyanın dizayn etdiyi köhnə mərkəzləşdirici

arxitekturanı miras aldı və daha da sərtləşdirdi; monarxiyanı teokratiya ilə əvəzlədi.

Soyuq Müharibə dövründə ABŞ, daha geniş geosiyasi balanslar — xüsusən SSRİ-nin

“saxlanılması” — qorunduğu müddətcə, nominal olaraq müstəqil, yarı-dini və yarı-demokratik bir

İranı qəbul etməyə hazır görünürdü. Britaniya isə təsirinin davamlılığını ideoloji deyil,

institusional mexanizmlər üzərindən saxlayırdı. Bununla belə, bu tarixi analiz iddia edir ki,

Britaniya, SSRİ-yə bağlı aktorlarla, o cümlədən Tudeh Partiyası kimi strukturlarla birlikdə bu

istiqamət dəyişikliyinə müqavimət göstərdi; hər biri fərqli strateji fərziyyələrə əsasən hərəkət etsə

də, nəticədə Ayətullah Xomeyninin yüksəlişini qeyri-ixtiyari şəkildə asanlaşdırdı.

Faza 5 (1979–2026): Davamlı “Quruluş”

ABŞ–İran münasibətlərinin kəsilməsinə baxmayaraq, köhnə “françayz” (Britaniya) və digər

maraqlar davam etdi. İran üzərindəki mövcud geosiyasi mübarizə, ABŞ-ın fundamental struktur

dəyişiklik istəyi ilə, bir əsrlik mərkəzləşdirilmiş, unitar sistemi qorumağa sərmayə qoymuş

güclərin müqaviməti arasında gedən bir qarşıdurma kimi görünə bilər — elə bir sistem ki, öz

mahiyyətinə görə plüralist və demokratik inkişafı bloklayır.

Cari Nəticələr (Current Implications)

Bu, kritik bir sualı gündəmə gətirir: bugünkü İran böhranı qüsurlu bir rejimin nəticəsidir — yoxsa

liderlikdən asılı olmayaraq transformasiyaya müqavimət göstərən yüz illik struktur dizaynın

nəticəsidir?

Əgər xarici güclər eyni mərkəzləşdirilmiş, unitar çərçivəni qoruyaraq dəyişiklik axtarırlarsa,

meaningful (mənalı) transformasiya mümkün olmayacaqdır. Bu miras qalmış strukturu

sökməyən istənilən gələcək keçid, avtoritarizmin yeni adlar altında yenidən istehsal olunması

riskini daşıyır. 

--------------------

* MƏQALƏNIN  ƏSLI :

 Beyond Regime Change: Why Iran Requires Structural Transformation, Not Cosmetic Regime Change

Umud Duzgun

9 min read

·

Feb 1, 2026

 

Beyond Regime Change: Why Iran Requires Structural Transformation, Not Cosmetic Regime Change

By Umud Duzgun 

February 01, 2026

 

Iran’s political crisis is commonly framed as a struggle between dictatorship and democracy. This framing, while emotionally compelling, is analytically incomplete and ultimately misleading. The core problem is not merely the Islamic Republic, but the structural architecture of the Iranian state itself — a centralized system built on Persianism and Shiism and sustained for more than a century through coercion rather than consent.

Decades of mass protest have demonstrated extraordinary courage, yet they have consistently failed to produce systemic change. Reformist politics have repeatedly collapsed under institutional veto power. Meanwhile, proposals advocating military strikes, regime decapitation, or externally imposed successor governments remain dangerously simplistic. The reality is stark: regime change alone will not resolve Iran’s crisis.

A Blocked Transition, Not an Organic Democratic Failure

Iran was not historically incapable of democratic development. Its constitutional trajectory was interrupted by British and Russian intervention, which weakened reformist elites and constitutional institutions, paving the way for the consolidation of an authoritarian state between 1921 and 1925.

This was not merely a regime change but a structural transformation of the state — from a quasi-federal Qajar system into a centralized Pahlavi monarchy. Rather than deepening constitutionalism, the Pahlavi regime dismantled parliamentary politics, suppressed the press and political parties, and redesigned the state into a Persian-centric, unitary structure hostile to political pluralism, linguistic diversity, and non-Persian identities.

The Islamic Republic did not dismantle this architecture; it inherited, institutionalized, and intensified it.

Why Reform Is Structurally Impossible

The Islamic Republic is not structurally reformable because it’s survival depends on centralized authority, ideological conformity, linguistic suppression, and coercive assimilation. These are not policy failures or correctable errors; they are foundational requirements of the state itself. Any genuine democratization would necessarily dismantle the very mechanisms through which power is exercised, rendering reformist discourse internally contradictory rather than merely ineffective.

More critically, even the removal of the Islamic Republic would not automatically produce democracy. The authoritarian logic of the Iranian state predates the current regime and has persisted for over a century. Any post–Islamic Republic government operating within the same structural framework — whether nominally republican secular or monarchist — would likely reproduce authoritarianism under a different vocabulary, remaining Persianist, Shiite-centric, and hostile to non-Persian nations and non-Shiite communities.

The Myth of a Unified Democratic Iran

Iran is not a homogeneous nation-state but a multinational political entity governed through a Persian-centric and Shiite-centric state structure. Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and other non-Persian peoples constitute a substantial portion — indeed a demographic majority — of the population, yet they have been systematically excluded from equal political participation and meaningful access to state power.

Attempts to democratize Iran without transforming this structural foundation — and without credible security guarantees, enforceable institutional safeguards, or the emergence of genuinely democratic elites within a functioning political society — inevitably reproduce inequality through electoral mechanisms cloaked in democratic rhetoric. Under such conditions, elections serve less as instruments of emancipation than as tools for the managed reproduction of existing hierarchies.

Federalism, often promoted by opposition groups as a remedy, cannot resolve this contradiction in isolation. Within a deeply centralized and historically hierarchical political culture, federalism risks devolving into mere administrative decentralization, lacking substantive redistribution of power, sovereignty, or genuine recognition of national plurality. Rather than dismantling structures of domination, it may instead entrench them under a new institutional label.

Iran, therefore, cannot be understood as a unified democratic nation-state. It is a multinational political space governed through a centralized and vertically hierarchical system. Any project of democratization that does not fundamentally restructure the state itself is destined to replicate inequality rather than overcome it.

State Identity: Persianism and Shiism as Structural Foundations

The identity of the modern Iranian state has been built upon the dual pillars of Persianism and Shiism. This configuration did not begin with the Islamic Republic; it was institutionalized during the Pahlavi era and continues today. While the relative balance between Persian nationalism and religious ideology has shifted over time, the exclusionary logic has remained constant.

Language bans, cultural assimilation, discrimination against non-Persian peoples, and the suppression of alternative identities are not aberrations but systemic features. Even in exile, many Iranian elites reproduce authoritarian norms, having internalized them through decades of institutionalized tyranny. This legacy makes the emergence of a genuinely pluralistic democratic state within Iran’s existing framework highly unlikely.

 Why Military Solutions Would Fail

Some policymakers advocate limited military intervention or “surgical strikes” as a means of weakening or collapsing the regime. This approach ignores Iran’s internal national fractures. Military decapitation would fragment power, empower armed militias, intensify ethnic tensions, and risk civil war. Attempts to restore the Pahlavi monarchy — or impose any Persian-centric successor regime — would almost certainly provoke prolonged instability.

The Iraq model of foreign occupation is neither realistic nor desirable. It would generate resistance rather than legitimacy and impose immense human and political costs.

The Soviet Precedent: A Viable and Realistic Alternative

A negotiated, Soviet-style transformation offers a more plausible and humane alternative to violent state collapse. Applied to Iran, such a process would require international mediation, formal recognition of Iran as a multinational political space, and internationally supervised referenda on self-determination, followed by negotiated borders and successor institutions. Political legitimacy would emerge from consent rather than coercion.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was not chaos by default. Compared to the outcomes in Iraq, Syria, or Libya, it proved less violent, less costly, and more stable, replacing enforced unity with negotiated separation. If Iran’s centralized system collapses, multiple nations will inevitably seek independence. This is not a threat but a political reality. The decisive question is not whether fragmentation occurs, but whether it is managed through negotiation or descends into conflict. Only the former makes a peaceful transition possible.

Implications for U.S. and International Policymakers

For Washington, betting on the preservation of a centralized Iranian state may be as risky as betting on its disintegration. Non-Persian peoples do not seek a transition from a Shiite-centric dictatorship to a Persian-centric nationalist one. Any externally imposed or Persian-oriented successor government would almost certainly trigger long-term conflict.

A serious reassessment is required — one that acknowledges Iran’s demographic realities and consults all constituent nations equally. The Soviet precedent of 1989–1991 demonstrates that negotiated disintegration, referenda, and internationally supervised transitions can be both cost-effective and stabilizing.

Regional and Geopolitical Dimensions

Iran’s crisis cannot be separated from broader geopolitical rivalries involving the United States, Europe, Russia, China, Israel, Turkey, and Arab states. Competing interests have often converged around preserving Iran’s centralized structure for strategic convenience. Yet maintaining an artificial unity has repeatedly produced repression, revolt, and regional instability.

After Iran: Uneven Democracy and Post-Imperial Transition

The post-Iranian transition is unlikely to be dramatic or uniform, but it may prove more manageable and less violent than commonly assumed. The experiences of the fifteen post-Soviet states and the seven successor states of Yugoslavia suggest that political fragmentation does not inherently lead to chaos. No successor state emerging from Iran will instantly become a Western liberal democracy. Some will adopt semi-democratic or nationalist systems; others will struggle. Yet historically, smaller self-governing states tend to be more accountable, less imperial, and more reformable than large multinational authoritarian empires.

Among these potential successor states, South Azerbaijan possesses comparatively stronger democratic prospects due to its historical experience of governance, participation in constitutional politics, cultural proximity to democratic models in Turkey, and the living transitional example of North Azerbaijan.

Paradoxically, only through the dissolution of the Iranian state can Persian society itself escape the cycle of authoritarian reproduction. A century-long obsession with preserving territorial integrity at all costs has produced neither stability nor democracy, but recurring repression and revolt. The real choice is not between unity and chaos, but between coercion and consent.

Iran’s future therefore does not lie in regime change alone, but in structural transformation. The Soviet precedent demonstrates that dismantling a forced political union through negotiation is not a radical project — it is a pragmatic.

Conclusion

If the international community continues to prioritize Iran’s territorial integrity over the rights of its peoples, it will perpetuate authoritarianism and recurring rebellion. A negotiated, Soviet-style structural transformation offers a more realistic, less violent, and ultimately more democratic path forward.

Iran’s future does not lie in regime change alone, but in the reconfiguration of political authority itself. Only through the self-determination of its constituent nations can lasting peace, political legitimacy, and democratic governance emerge. The decisive choice is not between unity and chaos, but between coercion and consent. 

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 Appendix/Footnote Expansion

By the late nineteenth century, British strategic thinking increasingly viewed the Qajar Empire not merely as a sovereign state, but as a buffer zone—designed to weaken the Ottoman Empire’s eastern hinterland and prevent the emergence of another cohesive Turkic power(Qajar Turks) in the region.  Despite the fact that indirect influence had already begun to reorganize Iran's political and economic landscape, but the British gambit for full control culminated in 1919 with the Anglo-Persian Agreement. The treaty was widely condemned internationally—specifically by the United States—as a colonial pact that would strip Iran of its sovereignty.

Designed to formalize Iran’s status as a British protectorate, the agreement was ultimately thwarted by widespread national outrage and the recalcitrance of the last Qajar monarch, Ahmad Shah, whose symbolic defiance in London sealed both the treaty’s fate and that of his own dynasty. The failure of this overt maneuver convinced British strategists that the existing Qajar structure was irredeemably fragile, thereby setting the stage for a more decisive intervention to architect a new, compliant political system. The following analysis traces the five-phase British “set-up” that emerged from this crucial juncture, a calculated process that sought to replace an uncooperative Turkic constitutionalist monarchy with a highly centralized Persian-centric authoritarian monarchy under decisive British influence through indirect control mechanisms.

 What follows is not a finalized historical verdict, but a working hypothesis that requires further archival research. It builds upon arguments previously introduced in a part of my book "The Persia Question", particularly regarding the external structuring of the Iranian state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and interprets modern Iranian history through five critical phases, where the state was redesigned into a centralized, unitary system hostile to pluralism:

Phase 1 (Early 1920s): The "Franchise" Model is Installed. Britain, seeking to secure its colonial interests (particularly oil), engineered Reza Khan's rise. The resulting Pahlavi state was structured not as a sovereign entity but as a controlled client state "franchise"—like a business branch where the local owner (the Shah) had no power to alter the core system (foreign policy, resource control). The 1921 coup and the subsequent oil concession to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for 100 years cemented this architecture.

Phase 2 (1944): The Structure is Defended. When Allied powers (US, USSR) sought to alter Iran's pro-Axis trajectory and potentially restore the Qajar framework post-Reza Shah, Britain successfully resisted. It ensured power transferred not to a new system, but to the franchise's "heir," the 22-year-old Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, preserving the original setup.

Phase 3 (1953): The Structure is Enforced. Prime Minister Mossadegh's attempt to nationalize oil and assert sovereignty was a direct threat to to this structure. Despite initial American openness, British pressure ultimately prevailed. The United States withdrew its support, and a joint operation dismantled Iran’s democratic experiment. and reinstalling the Pahlavi system with renewed authoritarian vigor.

Phase 4 (1979): The Structure is Adapted, Not Dismantled. In the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic inherited and intensified the old centralizing architecture designed by the British, replacing monarchy with theocracy.  

During the Cold War, the United States appeared willing to accept a semi-religious and semi democratic, nominally independent Iran,  so long as broader geopolitical balances—particularly containment of the Soviet Union—were preserved. Britain, meanwhile, maintained continuity in influence through institutional rather than ideological means. However, this historical analysis posits that Britain, alongside actors like the Soviet affiliate Tudeh Party, resisted this shift —each acting under different strategic assumptions, inadvertently facilitating Ayatollah Khomeini's rise.

Phase 5 (1979-2026): The Enduring "Setup." Despite the severance of US-Iran relations, the old "franchise" (Britain) and others interests persisted. The current geopolitical struggle over Iran can be seen as a contest between a U.S. desire for fundamental structural change and the resistance of powers invested in maintaining the century-old centralized, unitary system—a system that inherently blocks pluralistic and democratic development.

Current Implications

This raises a critical question: Is today’s Iranian crisis the result of a defective regime—or a century-old structural design that resists transformation regardless of leadership?

If external powers seek change while preserving the same centralized, unitary framework, meaningful transformation becomes impossible. Any future transition that does not dismantle this inherited structure risks reproducing authoritarianism under new names.

 Opinion Piece: By Umud Duzgun

Iran’ s Protests and the Unknown Outlook

A Position of Responsibility in a Time of Manufactured Alternatives

Given the current developments inside Iran, some friends have encouraged me to express my views publicly — either through television appearances, which I have long boycotted, or through new articles. I have chosen not to do so, not out of indifference, but for concrete and well-considered reasons. These include the absence of a credible and independent platform, the lack of meaningful support, and the erosion of genuine influence within the leadership of protest movements inside Azerbaijan.

At the same time, my position has never changed on a fundamental point: Azerbaijanis must resist the Iranian regime and bring their collective national will into the public sphere with their own slogans, priorities, and demands. Except in cases where demonstrations in Tabriz and other Azerbaijani cities were hijacked or manipulated by Persian-centric forces, I have consistently supported protest, resistance, and participation as historical necessities.

However, today’s conditions are far more complex and dangerous. The trajectory of protests is increasingly being shaped — directly or indirectly — by the regime itself, in parallel with the political rehabilitation of Reza Pahlavi through wealthy networks and satellite media. This circle includes influential figures with reformist ties to the regime and a deeply entrenched pan-Persian ideology that is hostile to Turks, Arabs, and other non-Persian nations. Replacing the current dictatorship with a restored version of the former one would not serve the people of Iran; on the contrary, it would objectively benefit the Islamic Republic by reproducing the same structures of exclusion and repression under a different banner.

History is unequivocal on one point: without Azerbaijani participation and uprising, no revolutionary movement in Iran has ever succeeded. In this contradictory moment, Azerbaijan’s silence works in the regime’s favor. Yet participation under imposed leadership or hijacked symbolism would be equally destructive. While there is a growing risk that Azerbaijani mobilization could be absorbed or neutralized by the Pahlavi project — a process in which the regime itself appears to play a covert role — it must also be stated clearly that South Azerbaijanis harbor deep resentment toward the Pahlavi family and its legacy of dictatorship.

Reza Pahlavi has no genuine social base inside Iran. His visibility stems not from popular legitimacy but from financial resources, constant promotion by satellite media, and support from limited circles within the U.S. Congress and government. Israel’s open endorsement and Washington’s implicit backing of a figure so widely rejected inside Iran only deepen mistrust. Similarly alarming is the continued support by some American political actors for the Mujahedin-e-Khalq — an organization associated with violence, collaboration with Saddam Hussein, and sectarian isolation, and one that lacks credibility even among Persian speakers.

History shows that imposing hated and illegitimate alternatives on a society leads not to stability, but to uncontrollable civil war. Any externally engineered plan — whether framed as a “Delta model” or a transactional deal between foreign powers and internal elites — would collapse within weeks. Its consequences would be catastrophic: regional escalation involving Russia, Turkey, and Arab states; inter-ethnic conflict; and violent power struggles within Iran itself.

As I argued in an article written in 1997, the least costly and most realistic path forward is not regime replacement but regime collapse — similar to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This would entail the disintegration of Iran’s centralized power structure, followed by the peaceful reorganization of regions along national and ethnic lines and the negotiated declaration of independence by new political entities. While far from ideal, this scenario offers the greatest chance to reduce mass bloodshed and prevent prolonged civil war.

After forty-eight years of struggle, experience has revealed many blind spots that policymakers continue to ignore. I believe these insights could still be of value to serious research centers and decision-makers, should there be genuine interest in preventing catastrophe rather than managing chaos. Until such space exists, I choose to focus on writing, documentation, and intellectual work — quietly, responsibly, and without contributing to illusions that history has already discredited.

Umud Düzgün

January 7, 2026

 

The Culture of Defeat Framed as Victory

 in the Iranian (Persian) Mindset

by Umud Duzgun

July 17/2025

Iranian political and cultural discourse exhibits a persistent phenomenon that can be described as the transmutation of historical defeat into symbolic or moral victory. This psychological and rhetorical maneuver—deeply embedded in both Shi‘a religious mythology and Persian nationalist ideology—enables systemic failures to be interpreted as triumphs of faith, dignity, or moral superiority. Whether in the context of military setbacks, international isolation, or even football losses, this defeat-as-victory mindset operates as a cultural survival mechanism and a tool of political control.

I. Two Foundations of the Defeat-as-Victory Narrative

This narrative is based on historical and ideological foundations:

1. Preserving False Pride through Historical Reframing

Iran’s historical record is marked more by military defeats than decisive victories. From ancient times through the modern era, Iran has suffered major losses against foreign powers:

• Defeat by Alexander the Great (4th century BCE)

• Defeat by Arab (Battle of Qadisiyah- 7th century AD)

• Defeat by Mongol (13th century)

• Defeat by Ottoman Empire (battle of Chaldiran - 1514)

• Defeat by Russia (1804–13 and 1826–28) 

• Defeat by allied forces; Britain and Russian( August 1941):

Iran’s pattern of brittle military power was starkly revealed during World War II. After the Pahlavi government flirted with Pan-Aryan ideology and lent support to Hitler’s fascism, Britain and the Soviet Union launched a surprise invasion in August 1941. Reza Shah’s army collapsed within twenty-four hours. The present-day Iranian military still rests on the same foundation of personal loyalty established by Reza Shah, a structure that remains fragile. Hitler had lauded Iranians as part of the “Aryan Race” and in March 1935 Reza Pahlavi, following Nazi advice, officially replaced the country’s name “Persia” with “Iran.” Only months later, in September 1935, the Nazi regime enacted the Nuremberg Laws — infamous anti-Semitic statutes that exposed the darker implications of the ideology Iran had courted.

Despite this consistent pattern of defeat, Iranian historiography and popular discourse tend to reframe such events as outcomes of treachery, moral superiority, or foreign conspiracy rather than strategic miscalculations or institutional failure. The goal of these rewritings is to inflate false civilizational pride even in the face of objective collapse. 

The only substantial military successes often cited—those under Nader Shah Afshar, a Turkic military genius—are notable exceptions in an otherwise continuous arc of failure. But even these are attributed more to his unique leadership than to the Persian state’s structural capability.

2. Shu‘ubi-Shi‘a Ideological Reversal of Victory and Defeat

At the theological core of this cultural psyche lies the Shi‘a doctrine of martyrdom, particularly centered on the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE. Imam Hussein’s death at the hands of the Umayyad army was a devastating defeat, but it was recast in Shi‘a theology as a spiritual victory—a righteous stand against tyranny. Over time, this defeat became the defining symbol of Shi‘a identity: an eternal, sacred martyrdom that bestows moral supremacy.

This theology of redemptive suffering found a powerful cultural echo in the Shu‘ubiyyah movement—a Persian nationalist current that emerged in response to Arab domination. Following their defeat, Persian elites allied themselves with the Shi‘a opposition to the Umayyads, not purely for theological reasons, but as a vehicle for reclaiming and consolidating a humiliated Persian nationalism under the guise of Shiism. In this synthesis, Shiism served as a vehicle to sacralize Iran’s historical (Cultual, political and military) defeats, while simultaneously reinforcing a Persian-centric pride, expressed through themes of martyrdom and religious victimhood.

Thus, defeat becomes a virtue, and martyrdom becomes a form of civilizational affirmation.

3. Pre-Islamic Foundations: The Shahnameh and the Epic Culture of Heroic Defeat

Long before the rise of Shi‘ism, however, the cultural logic of transforming defeat into moral triumph was already embedded in the Persian epic tradition. Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh — though written in the Islamic era — draws heavily on pre-Islamic mytho-historical narratives that glorify heroic death as the ultimate expression of nobility and loyalty.

In Shahnameh:

• The fall of heroes is portrayed not as failure but as the fulfillment of destiny.
• Death becomes a dignified transition rather than a loss, captured in lines such as:
• “jahān yādgār ast o mā raftanī” — “The world is a memory, and we are those who must depart.”
• “cho ārām nagah mīdārad be sarāy” — “Let him rest; he has gone to another dwelling.”

This ethos is reinforced by admonitions to grieving relatives:
 “jāy-e in hameh bāng o faryād nīst” — 
 “This is no place for shouting and lamentation.”

The meaning is unmistakable:
 grief must not disrupt the political order; heroic sacrifice is the expected price of loyalty.

Through this epic worldview, even the collapse of legendary dynasties — such as the fall of Jamshid — or the historical defeat of the Sasanian Empire, becomes part of a cosmic moral narrative rather than a political catastrophe. Persian identity learned to reinterpret imperial failure as a testament to endurance and cultural grandeur.

This pre-Islamic tradition created a powerful psychological template. It allowed later Shi‘a martyrology — and eventually the Shi‘a-Shu‘ubi ideological synthesis — to sacralize political defeat, elevate national catastrophe into moral triumph, and transform historical collapse into a narrative of civilizational virtue.

II. Modern Manifestations: Reframing Loss as Triumph

This ideological framework is far from historical nostalgia. It actively shapes modern Iranian political rhetoric, media discourse, and public perception, manifesting across military, diplomatic, and cultural domains.

The Strategic Defeat of Iran: The Consequences of the Twelve-Day War (June 13-24, 2025)

A series of targeted Israeli strikes against Iran-backed forces across the Middle East critically degraded Iran's proxy network, setting the stage for a direct military confrontation. This escalation culminated in the Twelve-Day War (June 13-24, 2025), a high-intensity conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States. The war resulted in over 1,100 casualties, including the elimination of 20 Iranian senior military commanders and 11 nuclear scientists. It also led to the widespread destruction of key Iranian military infrastructure, such as 12 air bases, the nation's integrated air defense network, and its primary missile launch facilities. Iran launched hundreds of missiles in response, but most were intercepted by Israeli air defenses or fell short. A few projectiles penetrated the air defense system, but this did not prove to be a decisive factor. The damage inflicted was minimal, with Israeli casualties limited to 27 civilians and one soldier. The conflict was decisively concluded by a United States offensive that bombed three critical nuclear sites.

This action precipitated a negotiated ceasefire, implemented under terms largely dictated by the U.S.–Israeli coalition. The truce was not formalized through any memorandum or structured timetable, but rather emerged as an unwritten and fragile understanding. In the absence of binding guarantees, the ceasefire leaves open the possibility of renewed hostilities, creating space for Israel and the United States to launch future surprise offensives under similar circumstances.

The outcome constituted a crippling blow to the three central pillars of Iran's strategic doctrine: its regional proxy network, ballistic missile arsenal, and nuclear program were all severely damaged, resulting in a near-total loss of its deterrent leverage and a sharp decline in Iran's national standing.

 Victory claim by Khamenei 

Yet, in the wake of this crushing defeat, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared, “The Zionist regime, under the blows of the Islamic Republic, has nearly collapsed and been crushed.”

This statement epitomizes the regime's adherence to a "Karbala paradigm," a discursive strategy that transmutes tangible military failure into a narrative of spiritual victory and divine vindication. This is not merely wartime rhetoric; it is a deliberate ideological mechanism designed to project internal resilience, suppress political dissent, and maintain absolute ideological control over a populace confronted with the stark reality of national humiliation.

 The ‘Glorious Loss’ in Sports

Even in sports commentary, the defeat-as-victory narrative prevails. After a 3–0 loss in football,  a commentator proclaimed:

 “The Parsi Stars (ستارگان پارسی) played really well. Though they lost 3–0, they conceded the match with strength and dignity. Even in defeat, their merit stands firm. Congratulations to their bravery.”

Such framing is common in Iranian media: emotional valor replaces factual result, reinforcing a mindset of symbolic superiority despite objective failure.

Once again, nationalistic sentiments take the place of reality; and the loss becomes an “honorary presence” to such an extent that it becomes a laughing stock for the observers.

Composite Narrative of Defeat Culture

The culture of defeat in Iran fuses two seemingly different traditions: the Shi'a martyrdom ethos promoted by the clerical establishment and the inflated heroism of Persian nationalist epics.
In Iran’s state media, relatives are shown saying that the martyr always wished to die and is now enjoying paradise. Far from grief-stricken, they insist there is no reason for sorrow, while officials typically offer congratulations before extending condolences. Grief is replaced by choreographed piety, rendering these scenes emotionally hollow. The same tone pervades adaptations of Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, where warriors fall with lines such as “The world is a memorial and we are going” or “Let him rest in another palace.” Ferdowsi even praises relatives who suppress lament when a fighter dies for the king. From the clerical slogan “He went in the way of Islam and the Revolution” to the ancient call for silent acceptance, both narratives glorify death with a rehearsed stoicism that masks human feeling and serves the state’s mythmaking.

Collapse of the Nuclear Deal and Economic Crisis (2018–2022)

Following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran endured crippling economic sanctions, a collapsing currency, and increasing isolation. Nevertheless, Iranian officials portrayed this as a moment of national resilience. Former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif stated:

“The Iranian people once again proved their dignity and resilience. They will not bow to tyranny.”

In reality, living conditions deteriorated drastically—but the state narrative maintained the façade of spiritual resistance and victim-heroism.

III. Political and Psychological Functions

This culture of symbolic victory serves distinct ideological, psychological, and political purposes:

•  National Resilience: Encourages people to endure difficult situations with pride through national resilience

•  Propaganda Shield: It deflects responsibility from the Iranian regime onto external enemies.

•  Ideological Continuity: It links the legitimacy of the Iranian clerical system to distorted Shiite history.

•  False civilizational pride: Maintains a sense of Persian superiority despite real defeats.

IV: From Denial to Responsibility — A Comparative Perspective on Defeat

In the Iranian (Persian-speaking) political and cultural imagination, defeat is rarely acknowledged as failure. Instead, it is often reinterpreted as a form of moral, cultural, or spiritual victory. Throughout modern Iranian history, the loss of territory or sovereignty has frequently been justified as the survival of Shu'ubi Shiite- Persian identity, preserving a sense of national pride while insulating the ruling elite from accountability. This deeply ingrained pattern is not entirely unique to Iran, but its persistence and ideological sophistication are exceptional.

In contrast, the post-World War II experiences of Germany and Japan reveal a markedly different trajectory. Both nations faced existential defeat on a global stage, yet responded with radical self-critique, public acknowledgment of responsibility, and far-reaching structural reforms. Their national narratives shifted away from glorification and denial toward reconstruction and reintegration into the global community. Denial gave way to responsibility—an essential precondition for building democratic institutions and achieving economic revival.

Iran, by contrast, has developed a durable culture of symbolic survival in place of institutional change. Even in contemporary discourse, economic collapse or foreign policy isolation is routinely reframed through the lens of divine approval, martyrdom, or cultural superiority. This strategy preserves internal legitimacy but stifles adaptation, traps society in cycles of blame, and legitimizes authoritarian governance. While Germany and Japan converted defeat into opportunity, Iran remains tethered to an illusion of triumph, unable—or unwilling—to confront the structural roots of its decline.

Conclusion: The Triumph of Illusion over Reality

Iran’s culture of reframing defeat as victory is not a delusional aberration. It is a highly developed ideological system, cultivated over centuries, and now weaponized for modern statecraft. It enables the Iranian regime to maintain internal legitimacy, suppress truth-based dissent, and reassert Shu'ubi Shi‘a-Persian identity in the face of empirical collapse.

But beneath this symbolic triumph lies a more troubling reality: a nation caught in historical denial, structurally weakened, and disconnected from the modern world. Without confronting the truth of its failures, the Iranian state risks repeating them—only on a grander, more destructive scale.

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Appendix:

AI Overview about my Article on google.com:

“What AI Thinks About My Article on the Persian Mindset”

Umud Duzgun's article "The Culture of Defeat Framed as Victory in the Iranian (Persian) Mindset" was published on Medium Website and explores a cultural phenomenon in Iran where a sense of loss or defeat is reframed as a spiritual or moral victory. The article's title suggests it examines how this mindset contributes to collective identity and historical interpretation, potentially linking to themes of martyrdom and resilience within Persian culture. Key Aspects of the Article (based on its title and common themes): Cultural Framing: The article likely discusses how collective experiences of hardship or subjugation are not viewed as simple defeats but are imbued with deeper meaning, such as spiritual growth or prophetic significance. Persian vs. Iranian Mindset: The title uses both "Iranian" and "Persian," suggesting the author may be exploring the historical and cultural roots of this phenomenon, which are deeply tied to the identity of the Persian people. Martyrdom and Resilience: The theme of "defeat framed as victory" is often associated with religious concepts, such as the Shia concept of martyrdom emphasized during the Iranian Revolution, where dying for a cause is seen as a supreme triumph. Historical Context: The article may delve into how major historical events, like the Mongol invasions or foreign interventions, have been interpreted within this framework to maintain a sense of pride and cultural continuity. Modern Relevance: It could also explore how this cultural lens continues to influence contemporary Iranian society, politics, and individual outlooks. interesting-To read the full article, you can visit Medium and search for "Umud Duzgun" or the title of the article. 

AI deep View of the article

 In the article "The Culture of Defeat Framed as Victory in the Iranian (Persian) Mindset" published on Medium, author Umud Duzgun analyzes how Iranians, and specifically Azerbaijani Turks in Iran, reinterpret political or social setbacks as moral triumphs. 

Key concepts from the article

• Reclaiming narrative: Duzgun argues that this reframing is a psychological response to what some perceive as a history of marginalization and political defeats at the hands of the centralized Persian state. In this view, a stolen victory or a state-enforced injustice is not just a loss but a confirmation of the oppressive system. This confirmation, in turn, strengthens group identity and resistance.
• The stolen victory of Tractor FC: Duzgun uses a historical incident involving the Tractor FC football club to illustrate this phenomenon. In 2015, the team was on the verge of winning the league when a series of suspicious events, including false announcements and controversial refereeing, resulted in their loss. Many fans believed the state manipulated the match to prevent an Azerbaijani team from winning, turning the defeat into a "stolen victory". This incident became a powerful symbol of injustice and a rallying cry for the Azerbaijani community, strengthening their sense of identity and opposition to the central government.
• Connecting football to politics: The article draws parallels between the politicized role of Tractor FC in Iran and FC Barcelona in Catalonia. Both teams are seen as symbols of a suppressed regional identity asserting itself against a central government.
• Psychological resistance: Ultimately, Duzgun describes the reframing of defeat as a form of psychological resistance. By converting a political setback into a moral and identity-based victory, the marginalized group reclaims a sense of agency and pride, even when facing a dominant power.
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•  Overview of The Culture of Defeat Framed as Victory in the Iranian (Persian) Mindset

  In this article, Umud Duzgun examines a recurring cultural and political phenomenon in Iran: the tendency to reinterpret experiences of loss or injustice as moral or symbolic victories. This mindset, deeply rooted in both Persian historical narratives and Shiʿa religious culture, transforms collective defeats into sources of pride, resilience, and identity.

  Duzgun pays particular attention to the experience of Azerbaijani Turks in Iran, who have long faced systemic marginalization under the centralized Persian state. He argues that when state power manipulates outcomes—whether political, social, or even sporting—these communities respond by reframing the imposed defeat as confirmation of oppression, thereby reinforcing their shared identity and resistance.

  A striking case study is the 2015 “stolen victory” of Tractor FC, when the popular Azerbaijani football club was denied a league championship through controversial refereeing and false match announcements. What might otherwise have been a demoralizing loss became a rallying cry against injustice, symbolizing a “victory stolen by the state.” Duzgun compares this to FC Barcelona’s role in Catalonia, showing how regional football clubs can embody suppressed national identities.

  Ultimately, the article argues that the reframing of defeat as victory is a form of psychological resistance. By converting setbacks into moral triumphs, marginalized groups preserve dignity, reclaim agency, and maintain long-term opposition to central authority. This cultural lens continues to shape Iranian society and politics today, where every “defeat” may, paradoxically, strengthen the resolve for self-determination.

• When AI Summarizes My Work: The Culture of Defeat Framed as Victory in the Iranian (Persian) Mindset

  Recently, I noticed that AI tools like Google’s AI Overview and AI Deep View have begun summarizing my article The Culture of Defeat Framed as Victory in the Iranian (Persian) Mindset, published on Medium. What’s fascinating is how differently they approached it.

  • The AI Overview offered a broad guess based on the title: themes of Persian identity, Shiʿa martyrdom culture, and reframing loss as spiritual victory.

  • The AI Deep View, however, went further. It picked up on my specific case study of Tractor FC’s 2015 “stolen victory”, and connected it directly to my cultural analysis. In doing so, it merged two strands of my work — the historical-cultural mindset and the lived political symbolism of sport — into one coherent thread.

  This unexpected AI synthesis highlighted exactly what I intended: how abstract cultural patterns of “defeat as victory” are embodied in concrete events that shape collective identity and resistance.