Beyond Regime Change: Why Iran Requires Structural Transformation, Not Cosmetic Regime Change
By Umud Duzgun
February 01, 2026
Iran’s political crisis is commonly framed as a struggle between dictatorship and democracy. This framing, while emotionally compelling, is analytically incomplete and ultimately misleading. The core problem is not merely the Islamic Republic, but the structural architecture of the Iranian state itself — a centralized system built on Persianism and Shiism and sustained for more than a century through coercion rather than consent.
Decades of mass protest have demonstrated extraordinary courage, yet they have consistently failed to produce systemic change. Reformist politics have repeatedly collapsed under institutional veto power. Meanwhile, proposals advocating military strikes, regime decapitation, or externally imposed successor governments remain dangerously simplistic. The reality is stark: regime change alone will not resolve Iran’s crisis.
A Blocked Transition, Not an Organic Democratic Failure
Iran was not historically incapable of democratic development. Its constitutional trajectory was interrupted by British and Russian intervention, which weakened reformist elites and constitutional institutions, paving the way for the consolidation of an authoritarian state between 1921 and 1925.
This was not merely a regime change but a structural transformation of the state — from a quasi-federal Qajar system into a centralized Pahlavi monarchy. Rather than deepening constitutionalism, the Pahlavi regime dismantled parliamentary politics, suppressed the press and political parties, and redesigned the state into a Persian-centric, unitary structure hostile to political pluralism, linguistic diversity, and non-Persian identities.
The Islamic Republic did not dismantle this architecture; it inherited, institutionalized, and intensified it.
Why Reform Is Structurally Impossible
The Islamic Republic is not structurally reformable because it’s survival depends on centralized authority, ideological conformity, linguistic suppression, and coercive assimilation. These are not policy failures or correctable errors; they are foundational requirements of the state itself. Any genuine democratization would necessarily dismantle the very mechanisms through which power is exercised, rendering reformist discourse internally contradictory rather than merely ineffective.
More critically, even the removal of the Islamic Republic would not automatically produce democracy. The authoritarian logic of the Iranian state predates the current regime and has persisted for over a century. Any post–Islamic Republic government operating within the same structural framework — whether nominally republican secular or monarchist — would likely reproduce authoritarianism under a different vocabulary, remaining Persianist, Shiite-centric, and hostile to non-Persian nations and non-Shiite communities.
The Myth of a Unified Democratic Iran
Iran is not a homogeneous nation-state but a multinational political entity governed through a Persian-centric and Shiite-centric state structure. Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and other non-Persian peoples constitute a substantial portion — indeed a demographic majority — of the population, yet they have been systematically excluded from equal political participation and meaningful access to state power.
Attempts to democratize Iran without transforming this structural foundation — and without credible security guarantees, enforceable institutional safeguards, or the emergence of genuinely democratic elites within a functioning political society — inevitably reproduce inequality through electoral mechanisms cloaked in democratic rhetoric. Under such conditions, elections serve less as instruments of emancipation than as tools for the managed reproduction of existing hierarchies.
Federalism, often promoted by opposition groups as a remedy, cannot resolve this contradiction in isolation. Within a deeply centralized and historically hierarchical political culture, federalism risks devolving into mere administrative decentralization, lacking substantive redistribution of power, sovereignty, or genuine recognition of national plurality. Rather than dismantling structures of domination, it may instead entrench them under a new institutional label.
Iran, therefore, cannot be understood as a unified democratic nation-state. It is a multinational political space governed through a centralized and vertically hierarchical system. Any project of democratization that does not fundamentally restructure the state itself is destined to replicate inequality rather than overcome it.
State Identity: Persianism and Shiism as Structural Foundations
The identity of the modern Iranian state has been built upon the dual pillars of Persianism and Shiism. This configuration did not begin with the Islamic Republic; it was institutionalized during the Pahlavi era and continues today. While the relative balance between Persian nationalism and religious ideology has shifted over time, the exclusionary logic has remained constant.
Language bans, cultural assimilation, discrimination against non-Persian peoples, and the suppression of alternative identities are not aberrations but systemic features. Even in exile, many Iranian elites reproduce authoritarian norms, having internalized them through decades of institutionalized tyranny. This legacy makes the emergence of a genuinely pluralistic democratic state within Iran’s existing framework highly unlikely.
Why Military Solutions Would Fail
Some policymakers advocate limited military intervention or “surgical strikes” as a means of weakening or collapsing the regime. This approach ignores Iran’s internal national fractures. Military decapitation would fragment power, empower armed militias, intensify ethnic tensions, and risk civil war. Attempts to restore the Pahlavi monarchy — or impose any Persian-centric successor regime — would almost certainly provoke prolonged instability.
The Iraq model of foreign occupation is neither realistic nor desirable. It would generate resistance rather than legitimacy and impose immense human and political costs.
The Soviet Precedent: A Viable and Realistic Alternative
A negotiated, Soviet-style transformation offers a more plausible and humane alternative to violent state collapse. Applied to Iran, such a process would require international mediation, formal recognition of Iran as a multinational political space, and internationally supervised referenda on self-determination, followed by negotiated borders and successor institutions. Political legitimacy would emerge from consent rather than coercion.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union was not chaos by default. Compared to the outcomes in Iraq, Syria, or Libya, it proved less violent, less costly, and more stable, replacing enforced unity with negotiated separation. If Iran’s centralized system collapses, multiple nations will inevitably seek independence. This is not a threat but a political reality. The decisive question is not whether fragmentation occurs, but whether it is managed through negotiation or descends into conflict. Only the former makes a peaceful transition possible.
Implications for U.S. and International Policymakers
For Washington, betting on the preservation of a centralized Iranian state may be as risky as betting on its disintegration. Non-Persian peoples do not seek a transition from a Shiite-centric dictatorship to a Persian-centric nationalist one. Any externally imposed or Persian-oriented successor government would almost certainly trigger long-term conflict.
A serious reassessment is required — one that acknowledges Iran’s demographic realities and consults all constituent nations equally. The Soviet precedent of 1989–1991 demonstrates that negotiated disintegration, referenda, and internationally supervised transitions can be both cost-effective and stabilizing.
Regional and Geopolitical Dimensions
Iran’s crisis cannot be separated from broader geopolitical rivalries involving the United States, Europe, Russia, China, Israel, Turkey, and Arab states. Competing interests have often converged around preserving Iran’s centralized structure for strategic convenience. Yet maintaining an artificial unity has repeatedly produced repression, revolt, and regional instability.
After Iran: Uneven Democracy and Post-Imperial Transition
The post-Iranian transition is unlikely to be dramatic or uniform, but it may prove more manageable and less violent than commonly assumed. The experiences of the fifteen post-Soviet states and the seven successor states of Yugoslavia suggest that political fragmentation does not inherently lead to chaos. No successor state emerging from Iran will instantly become a Western liberal democracy. Some will adopt semi-democratic or nationalist systems; others will struggle. Yet historically, smaller self-governing states tend to be more accountable, less imperial, and more reformable than large multinational authoritarian empires.
Among these potential successor states, South Azerbaijan possesses comparatively stronger democratic prospects due to its historical experience of governance, participation in constitutional politics, cultural proximity to democratic models in Turkey, and the living transitional example of North Azerbaijan.
Paradoxically, only through the dissolution of the Iranian state can Persian society itself escape the cycle of authoritarian reproduction. A century-long obsession with preserving territorial integrity at all costs has produced neither stability nor democracy, but recurring repression and revolt. The real choice is not between unity and chaos, but between coercion and consent.
Iran’s future therefore does not lie in regime change alone, but in structural transformation. The Soviet precedent demonstrates that dismantling a forced political union through negotiation is not a radical project — it is a pragmatic.
Conclusion
If the international community continues to prioritize Iran’s territorial integrity over the rights of its peoples, it will perpetuate authoritarianism and recurring rebellion. A negotiated, Soviet-style structural transformation offers a more realistic, less violent, and ultimately more democratic path forward.
Iran’s future does not lie in regime change alone, but in the reconfiguration of political authority itself. Only through the self-determination of its constituent nations can lasting peace, political legitimacy, and democratic governance emerge. The decisive choice is not between unity and chaos, but between coercion and consent.




